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The series of Handbooks in Central Banking and the accompanying Lecture series form a key part of the 
activities of the Centre for Central Banking Studies (CCBS) at the Bank of England.  The CCBS has 
been in existence since 1990, delivering seminars, workshops and expert advice to central banks all over 
the world.  The Handbooks and Lectures cover the same subject matter; namely the technical and 
analytical aspects of central banking. 
The Handbooks and Lectures are aimed primarily at central bankers, and have proved an extremely
popular and useful reference works for all those looking for materials that provide both a clear analytical 
framework together with the practical application of these ideas. 
Most of the CCBS Handbooks and Lectures are also available from our website 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/handbooks_lectures.htm.  Several have been translated into 
Spanish, Russian and Arabic, and these versions are also available on the website. 
Our aim is to continue to add to the series, covering new areas of interest and also updating existing 
Handbooks to take account of recent developments.  Some of the latest Handbooks will include 
econometric exercises developed in our workshops, thus making these available to a wider audience. 
We hope you find the new additions to the series useful, and would welcome any comments on the 
Handbooks and Lectures and any suggestions for future topics. 
We should note that all views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank 
of England or Monetary Policy Committee members.
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3ABSTRACT
Monetary operations refer to the implementation of monetary policy – ensuring that the policy decision 
has the intended impact on financial markets, and on the economy more generally.  Under this broad 
umbrella, the monetary authorities need to decide which specific targets to aim at, and which policy 
instruments should be used.  For most countries the final long-term monetary target of the central bank 
is low and stable inflation.  For operational purposes, however, the day-to-day tactical target is usually 
to achieve a particular level of interest rates or the exchange rate. 
In market economies it is widely held that in the long run the most efficient instruments of monetary
policy (the operational levers) are those which best complement the workings of a market system.  This 
is why indirect market-based instruments – using the central bank’s balance sheet - are preferred to 
direct (administrative) controls.  The latter may work for a while, but tend to distort markets and are 
open to evasion.  This handbook examines the various different indirect instruments:  (i)  open market
operations (OMOs); (ii) standing facilities (SFs); and (iii) both required reserve (RRs, which have some
of the characteristics of direct controls) and voluntary or contractual reserves.  Open market operations 
are undertaken at the initiative of the central bank whereas standing facilities are used at the initiative of 
the commercial banks.  Participation in both is voluntary at the level of individual banks, whereas in 
most countries reserve requirements are an administrative imposition on all banks - albeit one which, 
through averaging, allows them a degree of day-to-day flexibility.
Monetary instruments are not only used to implement monetary policy; they are also used for liquidity 
management. This is an essential part of the central bank’s operations, in order to prevent the short-term
uncertainty and price volatility which day-to-day swings in market liquidity would otherwise cause. 
A certain amount of detail is given about current practice in countries, not to be prescriptive but to give 
some impression of the varying balance of instruments in the monetary policy framework of different 
countries.  Since monetary operations are continuously evolving, some of the detail described herein as 
current practice may become out of date, but the general principles and analysis remain valid. 
4MONETARY OPERATIONS 
1 INTRODUCTION
The main goal of monetary policy for most central banks is to achieve price stability through the 
maintenance of the internal or external value of the domestic currency.  In the domestic economy this 
means to keep inflation low and steady; externally, it normally means targeting the nominal exchange 
rate
1.  Setting an explicit inflation target as the final goal of monetary policy has become increasingly 
popular over recent years.   By contrast, over the last decade many central banks have moved away from
formal pegs or tightly-managed exchange rates
2.
In practice, for many smaller open economies the policy choice between a domestic or external target is 
not clear cut. Where there is a rapid pass-through from exchange rate movements to domestic inflation, 
or where central bank credibility is not sufficiently strong, policy may in practice attempt to straddle 
both a domestic and an external target. 
In order to set the appropriate conditions for achieving the high-level goal, central banks sometimes use 
an intermediate target such as elements of the central bank’s balance sheet, or a broad monetary
aggregate or the exchange rate, to act as a nominal and easily visible anchor. In an inflation-targeting 
regime, some view the central bank’s inflation forecast as a form of intermediate target: a forecast out of 
line with the inflation target itself would prompt a policy reaction. Since most intermediate targets are 
outside the direct control of the central bank, it usually chooses a separate tactical target, which it can 
more directly control - typically a short-term interest rate or the exchange rate - which will influence the 
medium-term development of the intermediate target. In any case, in order to influence the markets, the 
central bank will use operational levers – financial transactions with the market - which involve using 
its balance sheet.
For example in the U.K. the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
3 sets a short-term
interest rate for the Bank’s transactions with the market (the operational lever), and the Bank’s 
operational framework is designed to ensure that market interest rates at maturities out to the next MPC 
1 Some countries target the real exchange rate: this will tend to stabilise competitiveness at the expense of more price 
volatility.
2 Calvo and Reinhart (November 2000): “Fear of Floating”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7993;
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7993), shows that the percentage of IMF member countries with a pegged exchange rate
dropped from 33% in 1985 to 11% in 1999, while those with fully flexible rates (at least notionally) rose from 25% to 45%.
In practice, many central banks manage their exchange rate even if it if formally free-floating.
5
3 Formed in 1997 when the Chancellor (Minister of Finance) announced that the Bank of England would have operational
independence for setting interest rates.meeting are consistent with this rate. The Bank has estimated that there is around a two-year lag before 
interest rate changes have a full effect upon inflation and therefore the Monetary Policy Committee will 
look, inter alia, at the 2 year inflation forecast
4 (the intermediate target) in deciding whether to adjust 
interest rates in order to achieve the Government-set inflation goal – currently, Consumer Price Index 
inflation of 2.0% year on year. 
If the high-level goal is the exchange rate, a central bank may be able to influence it directly by 
operating in the foreign exchange markets, although it could also use the interest rate channel to 
influence the exchange rate.
Understanding the central bank’s balance sheet is essential in considering monetary operations. The 
central bank is, by definition, the only (legal) supplier of reserve money – cash and commercial banks’ 
balances - and so it has, even in a liberalised financial system, a dominant influence over monetary
conditions
5.  Where the central bank’s balance sheet is liability-driven, and demand for central bank 
money is the dominant driver of balance sheet size, the commercial banks will typically have to borrow 
from the central bank. This lending provides a strong operational lever, since demand for central bank 
money – prior to the central bank’s operations – exceeds supply. But central bank influence may be 
weaker where its balance sheet is asset-driven and there is consequently an excess supply of reserve 
money: banks’ ‘free reserves’ – before central bank operations - exceed working or voluntary balances. 
This might reflect a legacy of monetary financing; or an exchange-rate or foreign reserves target, or 
other actions resulting in a net accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the central bank; or lender 
of last resort activities. In these circumstances, the marginal demand for central bank money might be 
zero or negative. The central bank can still exert influence over monetary conditions by acting as the 
marginal taker of central bank money, but in this case relies on its ability to pay, rather than on a legal 
monopoly over supply. In practice, the central bank’s freedom is often constrained in such 
circumstances by a concern that it may run a loss. 
The instruments used to impose monetary policy are the same as used to manage liquidity in the market.
Even if it did not want to guide the price of money (whether internal or external), it is almost universally 
the case that central banks seek to reduce the short-term volatility in prices which can arise from
fluctuations in liquidity. These fluctuations might arise from timing differences between government
revenue and expenditure; or between government expenditure financed by foreign exchange revenue, 
and the economy’s demand for foreign exchange. Without central bank intervention to offset these 
4 Although the inflation forecast is now published out to a third year, having been extended mechanically.
6
5 An exception is in so-called “dollarised” economies where foreign currency is used as a substitute for domestic cash as a
means of payment and as a store of value.  In this case the domestic central bank will have limited control over inflation (in
“dollar” terms) or economic activity in its economy.liquidity fluctuations, short-term interest rates and/or the exchange rate will be more volatile than 
necessary; and this tends to disrupt financial sector development as well as potentially obscuring the 
central bank’s monetary policy. Liquidity management is therefore an essential part of efficient 
monetary operations by any central bank. 
This handbook does not go into detail on monetary policy frameworks (the transmission mechanism,
including the choice of intermediate and high-level goals of monetary policy
6), but will concentrate on the 
operational framework and the monetary policy instruments (the operational levers) within that.
6 See Handbook No 1 “Introduction to monetary policy” and Handbook No 2 “The choice of exchange rate regime”.
72 INTERACTION BETWEEN TARGETS AND LEVERS 
i:  Domestically-framed monetary policy 
When choosing an operational lever, the central bank has to take account of the effectiveness and 
reliability of using that lever in hitting the policy target; the scope for and cost of using the lever in a 
given situation; and the impact on the financial markets and the economy more generally. For countries 
that choose to have a domestic (independent) monetary policy - and by implication accept a floating 
exchange rate - there is little choice in day-to-day operations but to target a short-term interest rate and 
support interest rate stabilisation, and indeed this is what most central banks choose to do. This interest 
rate – the Policy Rate – is normally that used for Open Market Operations (OMO). 
The day to day path of reserve money demand will tend to be quite volatile, in part because of strong 
within-week, within-month and month-to-month seasonality in demand for cash, and in part because of
the lumpy movement of some autonomous factors e.g. government monthly salary payments. These will 
be more important factors in a cash-based economy e.g. where savings are held in cash. The short-run 
demand curve for reserve money tends to be interest-rate inelastic: central banks do not expect a rate-
change today to affect demand for notes tomorrow; and if bank reserves are remunerated, their cost is 
not affected by changes in official interest rates.
To the extent there is an opportunity cost to holding precautionary reserves (reserves which may or may
not be excess, reflecting uncertainty in liquidity management), banks may be prepared to hold more if 
the opportunity cost falls – for instance, if the opportunity cost of holding the reserves falls, it may be 
cheaper to hold additional reserves than risk occasional borrowing from the credit SF. Ideally this 
should be, and in most developed markets is, a very small factor. For practical purposes in most
countries, the short-run demand curve may be characterised as vertical in respect of interest rates (but it 
will still be affected by non-interest rate factors), while the short-run supply curve is normally
horizontal: central banks tend to be accommodative in meeting the demand for high-powered money in 
the short-run - for instance, notes are normally supplied on demand. Even central banks with a monetary
aggregate target will tend to supply or absorb liquidity as necessary on a day-by-day basis. They target 
short-term interest rate stability in the short run
7 since they regard the uncertainty caused by short-term
volatility in interest rates as more harmful to the economy than short-term volatility in the quantity of 
reserve money.
8
7 Many countries have a narrow target range for interest rates which they attempt to maintain through a combination of open 
market operations and standing facilities.There may be clear structural reasons for using interest rate levers: for instance, in the U.K. there is a 
entral banks can take advantage of the short-run vertical slope of the reserve-money demand curve to 
high level of home ownership, and many owners fund their purchase with a variable-rate loan. Changing 
short-term interest rates can therefore have a very immediate impact on the cash flow of a large part of 
the population. There will also be more general reasons, such as the impact on investment borrowing – 
though in some economies the government is the chief borrower, while entrepreneurs may borrow 
informally, from friends and family, and this will tend to weaken the interest-rate transmission channel. 
A central bank might also prefer the interest-rate channel if there is no reliable short to medium-term
relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation - for instance, if the financial sector is 
undergoing substantial structural change such as de-dollarisation, or technical improvements to non-
cash payment systems which alter the structure of money demand.
C
change official – and thus market – interest rates, without the need for a change in the volume of reserve 
money. For any given level of demand for central bank money, the central bank will normally aim to 
supply (or drain) at the OMO/policy rate; and a change in the OMO rate will not have an immediate









M0 – reserve money
rates providing central bank operations are accommodative
M0D affected by
autonomous factors
Changes in demand for M0 do not need to impact on interest 
9
8 Unless free reserves are remunerated at a variable spread to the policy rate, so that a rate change affects the opportunity cost
to banks of holding precautionary central bank balances. The chart above illustrates that if OMOs do not accurately offset the impact of autonomous factors – 
whether because the liquidity forecast is inaccurate, or because the central bank does not aim fully to 
offset the shortage or surplus; and money demand moves to the left or the right of the horizontal OMO 
line – then the marginal interest rate at which banks transact with the central bank will change to the 
appropriate SF rates, with a consequent impact on market rates. 
In the somewhat longer term – over a period of several months or longer – the central bank may be able 
to target the size of its balance sheet (volume of reserve money), allowing the price (interest rates if 
internally-framed policy, the exchange rate if externally-framed) to vary in order to influence demand
for cash; though it will be more common for a central bank to target a wider money aggregate, including 
commercial bank lending, than a narrow one. Indeed, where inflation and consequently market interest 
rates are high and volatile, it may be difficult for the central bank to set an intervention rate which does 
not quickly appear to be out of line with the market.  The same may be true in a transition phase where 
the level of inflation is falling rapidly (eg Mexico in 1995-96). Countries with IMF financial 
programmes may have medium-term quantity targets for central bank assets or liabilities
9.  In these 
circumstances, the medium-term target may be the quantity of reserve money or central bank credit (see 
Appendix 1). But such targets cannot normally be met on a day-to-day, or week-by-week, basis, and the 
central bank may well still use an interest rate lever to achieve such an objective, raising rates to 
discourage lending growth etc. In any case, it would be very difficult to set a daily path for reserve 
money that was accurate enough not to generate volatility in interest rates and the exchange rate, so that 
in the short to medium term central banks will normally allow the reserve path to adjust.
As indicated earlier, whether or not a central bank uses an intermediate monetary aggregate target, its 
operational levers will almost always be exchange-rate or interest-rate based; and while the choice of
such an intermediate target may affect the way in which operational levers are used, it does not 
necessarily affect the choice of levers themselves.
(a) Maturity of interest rate operations 
In developed markets where the central bank’s tactical target is the short-term market interest rate, it 
usually seeks to use as a lever the very short end of the yield curve - from overnight up to, perhaps, two 




entral banks have adopted a base money target as an interim measure. It may be a crude target, but in volatile conditions 
where the recently-used nominal anchor has had to be abandoned, it can be useful in helping to re-stabilise the markets. And 
such targets are – at least prima facie – easy to understand and communicate, aiding credibility.weeks.  In this case, the central bank provides the net liquidity requirement to the banking sector for up to 
two weeks at its chosen intervention rate. In a number of countries – notably the UK and in the euro area 
– the intention is to steer the market yield curve until the end of the current maintenance period, which 
coincides with the regular Monetary Policy Committee/Governing Council meetings. Provided (i) there is 
no expectation of an official rate change before the end of the maintenance period and (ii) the central bank 
manages liquidity efficiently, then market rates to the end of the maintenance period should accurately 
flect the official rate.
scal stance, and balance of payments prospects) are credible, the yield curve may be 
latively flat.
t moving some of the liquidity provision onto a longer maturity (see Appendix 3 on size of 
perations).
inflation; and if in addition it is assumed that the real interest rate will be stable in the short term, then 
re
This inevitably affects the yield curve for longer maturities, but does not determine it.  The longer end of 
the yield curve – which may be represented by secondary-market yields on government securities - is 
normally determined by the financial markets.  Longer-term yields should, broadly, be a function of 
expected future short-term interest rates (themselves a function of expected inflation and the real interest 
rate) and a time-varying risk premium. If the market judges that the central bank will need to raise its 
policy rate in the future as a response to rising inflation, or a weakening of the exchange rate, the yield 
curve will have a positive (upwards) slope. But if the central bank’s monetary policy (and probably the 
government’s fi
re
In some transitional economies, open market outright purchases and sales of government securities of all 
maturities are an important liquidity management/monetary policy tool; but are also used for management
of the government debt market.  At times there may be conflicts of interest as the same instrument serves 
different purposes. If the central bank regularly intervenes at longer maturities as a price setter, then the 
yield curve will no longer be market-determined, and market arbitrage will not operate well. In developed 
markets, if the central bank operates at maturities much beyond a few weeks, it does so typically as a price 
taker. This is the case with the US Federal Reserve Bank’s ‘coupon passes’ (purchases of long-term
bonds). The Bank of England is considering a similar approach with the introduction of the new
operational system from 2006, when the prospective increase in the size of the Bank’s lending operations 
might suppor
o
If a central bank operates at more than one maturity, and uses different interest rates for those maturities – 
a number of central banks do this - it should consider carefully the implications of its rate structure. For 
instance, if it is accepted that forward rates are a combination of the real interest rate and expected future 
11using a higher interest rate for longer-term operations might imply that the central bank expects inflation 
to rise. If this is not the intended signal, then what does the rate differential mean?
10
The central bank could have different bases for different types of intervention, for example, a market-
based rate for open market operations and an independently-set rate for standing facilities – setting broad 
limits to interest-rate volatility without over-constraining the day to day market rate. But this need not 
affect the maturity of operations. Or it could use a policy rate for short-term operations and a market-
determined rate for longer term operations (so that the longer-term rate carries no monetary policy signal: 
the Bank of England and the ECB are examples of this approach).
(b) Relationship between the operational lever and the tactical target 
It is also important to consider the interaction of the central bank’s official rates and market rates. 
Theory might suggest that if the central bank wants to fix a short-term interest rate, then it should 
lend/withdraw as much liquidity as the market demands at that rate, so that the volume of its 
transactions would be potentially unlimited. In practice they are, of course, limited. If the market
counterparties requested substantially more or less than the market as a whole needed, and the central 
bank simply accommodated that, market interest rates would not long stay at the targeted level unless 
the central bank operated in both directions at the same interest rate
11. The market is not monolithic, and 
no individual participant knows what the overall need is. Central banks will, therefore, attempt to 
forecast the market need and operate in such a way as to meet that need. OMO operations are thus not 
unlimited
12. Similarly, use of the deposit SF cannot be unlimited, since it is constrained by the 
commercial banks’ holdings of central bank money. SF transactions are likely to be relatively small in 
relation to the size of the OMO where (i) the central bank’s liquidity forecast is good enough for OMO 
to be used effectively for liquidity management and (ii) the structure of operations and rates both allows 
and gives an incentive to the market to participate actively in OMO. Credit SF are also constrained, by 
the commercial banks’ holdings of securities eligible for use in credit SF operations. In some countries 
this will be relatively small; but provided it is larger than the expected need, the constraint is not 
binding.
It is clear that the banks will be influenced by the rate at which they borrow from/deposit with the 
central bank. The actual rate applied to the commercial banks’ transactions with the central bank will be 
the maturity- and volume-weighted average of their transactions using the different rates – OMO and 
10 It may be justified as a liquidity premium.
11 This does in fact happen in small number of cases; but the central bank is likely then to replace the market.
12
12 In general, potentially infinite transactions with the banks – whether OMO or SF – would imply infinite change in another,
offsetting element of the central bank’s balance sheet. This is clearly far from realistic. the SFs. Market rates will be affected by the expected rate applied to those transactions over a particular 
period, and the expected probability of use of the OMO and SF in that period. The central bank will 
normally want its policy and operations to be as transparent as possible, so that the gap between ‘actual’ 
and ‘expected’ is both stable and minimal. In particular, most central banks will aim to structure and 
operate their routine transactions with the market such that the market expects to transact in the 
necessary volumes at the policy rate, and in normal circumstances have only negligible recourse to the 
standing facilities. The short-term market rate resulting from central bank operations might be expected 
to be: 
Equation 1:
Short-term market rate = fn (OMO% * Pr.OMO,  SFd% * Pr.SFd, SFc% * Pr.SFc)
x Pr. represents the expected probability of using a given instrument, weighted by the value 
transacted and the number of days in the maintenance period, and all the probabilities sum to 1;
x OMO% = policy rate and SFd%, SFc% the relevant SF interest rates; 
x if there are additional SFs, or multiple OMO, they can be added to the list. 
If there is no remunerated deposit facility, then SFd% = 0; or one could add in to the equation 
“0%*Pr.Unremunerated excess reserves”. 
The short-term market rate may not exactly equal the weighted-average of expected rates. If from day to 
day the market is very uncertain which of the transactions will predominate, then market rates are likely 
to swing between the relevant rates. But if there is an expectation that OMO will deal with only half the 
volume of transactions required by the market, then the market rate is almost certain to move much
closer to the relevant SF rate. As market sentiment shifts from an expectation that use of SFs will be 






Non-linear move from OMO rate to SF rates
The turning points
13How far rates move towards the relevant SF rate will be a function of the expected size of SF use, and 
the degree of market certainty about its expectations. Longer-term rates will likely not move as sharply. 
In a number of markets where there is a surplus of liquidity, the central bank does not aim to drain all 
surplus liquidity in its OMO – essentially because of the cost of so doing – leaving sizeable balances to 
be placed in deposit SF, or earning no return. Market interest rates will then reflect the expectation of 
substantial use of the deposit SF, with short-term rates falling below the ‘policy’ rate. For instance, if a 
central bank is expected to drain only half the market surplus at 6%, and pay 1% on a standing deposit 
facility, overnight market rates would probably drop to around 1%, rather than hovering around 3.5%. 
The SFd would be the rate which guided the market: the cost of operations may thus constrain liquidity 
management, with consequences for policy implementation.
The turning point may come well before the half-way point. In the euro area, around 99.9% of 
commercial banks’ transactions with the ESCB, weighted by maturity and value, are OMO at (or close 
to) the policy rate; and the market rate through most of the maintenance period is very close to this. But 
on days (the last day or two of the maintenance period) when the market expects to have to use SF, 
while actual SF use is rarely as much as 5% of outstanding borrowing from the ESCB that day, 
overnight rates tend to move more than half way to the SF rate. (On the last day of the maintenance
period there may be no OMO, so Pr.OMO on that day will be equal to zero.) What is perhaps surprising 
is that the overnight rate does not move fully to the SF rate. A fourth factor might need to be included: 
the probability of not transacting with the central bank at all. We could add:  “???% * Pr.No transaction” to 
equation 1. The use of ???% for Pr.No transaction” reflects the uncertainty as to what this interest rate might
be: it will depend on market conditions and structure. But this underlines the importance of actual 
central bank transactions with the market in support of the central bank’s policy. If over time the market
did not expect to transact with the central bank at all or in any significant size, then the central bank’s 
policy rates would have much less impact (Appendix 3 discusses the size of central bank operations). It 
may also be the case that if the marginal cost of borrowing from/depositing with the central bank is 
small, and especially if administratively it is easier and there is a perceived stigma to paying a high rate 
in the market, banks may at times prefer to access standing facilities rather than using the market.
Market rates may not therefore move to the SF rates, even if banks have a strong expectation of having 
to use as SF. 
This approach still holds if the central bank undertakes some of its intervention in the foreign exchange 
market, or in the domestic currency at long maturities using a market-determined rate. These 
transactions may make it easier for the central bank to provide/withdraw the appropriate amount of 
liquidity; but it is the domestic currency transactions at the central bank’s official rates which will 
14determine short-term domestic currency interest rates. Where there is a foreign exchange target, and 
there are no substantial transactions at official interest rates (perhaps because there are none), the yield 
curve will reflect those of the targeted currency. 
(c) Corridor Systems 
Some countries minimise overnight interest-rate volatility by employing a very narrow corridor of 
standing facilities e.g. 50 basis points; this may be particularly helpful where there is no reserve 
averaging facility which banks could otherwise use to offset fluctuations in liquidity conditions.  While
mindful of not setting the width too narrow and intruding the central bank into normal market activity
13,
they argue the narrow corridor can be used not just as a safety valve for market liquidity management,
but also as a core instrument in guiding the structure of short-term interest rates.  The central banks of 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand all take this approach. The Bank of England will adopt, in its 
money market reforms from H1 2006, a reserve averaging system (with voluntary rather than required 
reserves, held in agreed – contractual - amounts) together with a narrow interest rate corridor on the last 
day of the maintenance period.
This approach limits market interest rate volatility from overnight (the normal maturity of the SFs) out 
to the next interest rate policy meeting (potentially several weeks); but in fact these – and many other - 
central banks expect market rates to trade at a much narrower spread to the central bank policy (target) 
rate than the width of the corridor.  This policy rate typically defines the centre of the corridor: the 
corridor is symmetric, the SF rates being set at the same margin above/below the policy rate. It is 
usually the rate applied to OMO tenders (the principle tool for providing liquidity to the market) in the 
case of a volume tender; or the rate which guides bids, in the case of a rate tender.  Exactly where in the 
corridor the market interest rate will trade will depend in part on the probability of use of the OMO and 
the two SFs.  If there is an equal probability of use of the SFs, then the average market rate should tend 
towards the centre of the corridor and hence the policy rate. The smaller the probability of using the 
SFs, the narrower the trading range of market rates should be
14. At the limit, if there is a zero probability 
of either facility being used, the market rate should equal the OMO, or policy, rate
15.
13 At the limit, if the SFs both carried the same rate – a zero width band – then commercial banks would deal with the central
bank rather than each other at the SF maturity, and no market rate could exist. 
14 In Australia, for instance, little use is made of the SF credit facility, as voluntary reserves levels adjust from day to day, in
much the same way as required reserves vary in reserve averaging systems.
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15 A further exposition on interest rate corridors can be found in Michael Woodford: “Financial Market Efficiency and the 
Effectiveness of Monetary Policy” (Princeton University, Department of Economics)As well as helping to set the structure of short-term interest rates, the corridor provides automaticity, as 
the central bank stands ready to deal with its counterparties on demand at both the upper and lower 
rates. Hence there is no danger of any ‘signal’ being read into the availability of these facilities.  Supporting 
he central bank can set a policy rate but operate a rate tender, allowing some (normally small)
r
) Monetary policy decisions and reserve maintenance periods 
-between meetings of the Bank of England’s MPC, or the Federal Reserve Federal Open Market 
this automaticity of standing facilities, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
16 also argues that due to the 
imprecise relationship between the quantity of settlement cash provided and the resulting level of
interest rates, choosing the appropriate structure and amount of operations to achieve a particular target 
– i.e. designing a pro-active volume-based OMO - may not be straightforward
17.
T
fluctuation in the actual rate of the OMO. For example, the ECB sets a minimum rate for the OMO, with 
actual rates being 5-10 basis points higher; and the US Fed sets a target rate, with actual operations up 
to 5-10 basis points above or below the target. As long as the volume supplied in the OMO, and the 
flexibility provided by reserve averaging – if available – is sufficient to supply (absorb) a shortfall 
(surplus) in liquidity, then market overnight rates should be around the policy rate. The more accurate 
the central bank’s operations, the tighter will be the spread around the policy rate. A central bank 
forecast of expected market demand is an important part of this process. But to the extent there is a 
market expectation that substantial use will need to be made of one or other of the SFs, then the market
rate will tend towards the relevant SF rate; and it is likely to do so in a non-linear way, as suggested 
earlier
18. As rates move towards the SF rates, market forces should tend to offset the move to the extent 
the ma ket has scope to manage the liquidity change. For instance, if there is a shortage of liquidity and 
rates rise, the reward for lending will increase, and the risk of having to access the credit SF will be 
reduced (because the gap between market rates and the SF rate has reduced). This should encourage 
more banks to lend out any precautionary holdings of liquidity, and so bring rates back down. 
(d
In
Committee (FOMC), or the relevant meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council, there will be a virtually 
zero expectation of changes in the rate structure, and short-term rates up to the next meeting should 
16 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (David Archer, Andy Brookes and Michael Reddell): “A Cash Rate System for
Implementing Monetary Policy”; http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/about/index.html
17 Similarly, the ECB devotes a lot of attention to its daily liquidity forecast and the volume of liquidity supplied in its 
MROs, despite the automaticity of its SFs, in order to keep the overnight market rate close to the minimum MRO rate. 
16
18 Bagheot, in ‘Lombard Street’ (1873): “Money is a commodity subject to great fluctuations of value and those fluctuations
are easily produced by a slight excess or a slight deficiency of quantity. Up to a certain point, money is a necessity. If a 
merchant has acceptances to meet tomorrow, money he must and will find today at some price or other. And it is this urgent
need of the whole body of merchants which runs up the value of money so wildly and to such a height in a great panic. On
the other hand, money easily becomes a ‘drug’, as the phrase is, and there is soon too much of it.”consequently be flat and around the policy rate, provided the central bank is expected to supply
19 the 
amount of liquidity the market needs at its policy rate.
If the start/end of the maintenance period and the policy decision dates do not coincide, then the market
a central bank reviews its official rates at irregular intervals which are not pre-announced, there will 
ii: Externally-framed monetary policy 
a fully liberalised system, including full convertibility on the external current and capital accounts, 
arket imperfections or administrative controls may enable the central bank temporarily to set both 
pegged.
may have to factor in different policy rates in a given maintenance period, and so the yield curve to the 
end of the maintenance period may not be flat. If there is strong speculation that rates might change 
during the maintenance period, this will influence the timing of reserve holdings. 
If
be some level of market uncertainty, and the short-term yield curve is likely to be more volatile as banks 
speculate about future changes in official rates. 
In
the central bank cannot guarantee maintaining both a domestically framed (independent) monetary
policy - whether tactically achieved through interest rates or foreign exchange operations - and an 
exchange rate target.  If it has an independent target for interest rates, for example, it will eventually 
have to accept the market-determined exchange rate. If, on the other hand, it targets the exchange rate it 
will have to accept the interest rates necessary to keep the exchange rate stable. Countries with a hard 
exchange rate peg typically use the yield curve of the target currency, sometimes with a small premium.
M
domestic monetary policy and the exchange rate.  This could be achieved, for example, through 
sterilised intervention
20 or the introduction of controls to put a wedge between the domestic financial 
market and the foreign one, such as controls on foreigners’ purchases of domestic financial assets, or 
indeed controls on cross-border capital transfers by residents.  But such controls tend to break down 
and/or become less effective over time if heavy reliance is placed on them
21.  Therefore, over any longer 
period, the central bank will need to choose whether to set its own independent monetary policy, or to 
target the exchange rate and accept the monetary policy of the country to which the exchange rate is 
19 In the case of all these three examples, the market has a structural shortage of liquidity.
20 Sterilised intervention is where the central bank offsets the monetary impact of its foreign exchange operations. For
example, the central bank may sell domestic currency and buy foreign exchange to prevent the domestic currency from
appreciating.  It could then “sterilise” the consequential increase in the money supply through, for example, selling bills or
increasing reserve requirements (though this would tend to increase interest rates and so put further upwards pressure on the
exchange rate). 
21 See Handbook No 2 “The choice of exchange rate regime”.
17A target for the exchange rate is seen in its strongest form where a currency board system is in operation 
.g. Argentina (until 2002), Bulgaria, Estonia, and Hong Kong) or in a monetary union when the national 
e rate target, a central bank could conduct domestic operations in order to keep 
terest rates at the level necessary to keep the exchange rate at the desired level.  These operations would 
(e
central banks cease to have any independent role in monetary policy (e.g. the euro area)
22.  A more
flexible approach is the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II)
 23 for countries wishing to join 
Economic and Monetary Union: the currency is tied to the euro and is able to fluctuate within a band 
around the central rate (some ERM members eg Estonia have a self-imposed more restrictive regime than 
required by the ERM). 
To achieve its exchang
in
be along the lines detailed in the first section of this chapter.  Alternatively, the central bank could stand 
ready to deal in foreign exchange with the market, though the credibility of this strategy would depend on 
having sufficient foreign exchange reserves.  If a central bank were to adopt a currency board framework,
sufficient foreign exchange reserves would be a pre-requisite. Normally, ‘sufficient’ is understood to 
mean exceeding central bank liabilities. 
22 The strongest form of an exchange rate target is ‘dollarisation’ where dollars (or some other foreign currency) are used in
place of domestic currency as a means of payment e.g. Ecuador with effect from 2000.
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23 Membership of ERMII includes: Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia as at October 2004. 3 BALANCE SHEET OF THE CENTRAL BANK
iii: The structure of the balance sheet 
The liabilities of the central bank - notes, required or contractual bank reserves, and free bank reserves - 
are called “reserve money” or “base money”. The economy requires reserve money because cash and 
free reserves at the central bank are the ultimate means of payment, carrying no credit risk; and the 
banking system intermediates between the central bank and the rest of the economy in obtaining the 
required liquidity.  Central banks can control or influence the level of short-term interest rates or the 
exchange rate – the internal or external price of the currency - by exploiting their monopoly over the 
supply of domestic currency reserves to commercial banks, to the extent that banks and their customers
have a demand for these reserves.  If the central bank’s balance sheet is liability driven – reserve money
is supplied only to meet demand – the central bank is in a strong position, as it can determine the terms
(ie the price) on which demand is met. By contrast, if its balance sheet is asset-driven, there will 
typically be an excess supply of liquidity in the market and the central bank’s role as monopoly supplier 
of liquidity is weaker. 
Table 1: stylised central bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Foreign assets (net)  Notes (and sometimes coin)
Lending to government (net)  Required or contractual bank reserves 
Lending to banks  Free bank reserves
+
Other items (net)  Liquidity draining operations* 
Capital and reserves 
+ including voluntarily-held reserves
* any transactions with banks to offset surplus liquidity, such as a deposit auction, use of standing deposit facilities, and sales of central bank bills. 
For liquidity management purposes, it is important to focus on balance-sheet items which reflect a cash-
flow. For instance, a foreign exchange transaction will result in a cash flow, affecting Net Foreign 
Assets and another balance sheet item (depending on the counterparty and balance sheet structure); but 
foreign exchange revaluations will not. Changes in ‘Capital and reserves’ may be a counterpart to a cash 
flow elsewhere; but it is the counterpart, rather than the change in this item per se, which needs to be 
taken into account.
Demand for notes The demand in the economy for notes is normally substantial in relation to the 
19central bank’s balance sheet. If cash is supplied to the population, via the banks, on demand, then by 
definition there should be no excess supply. But if cash in circulation is supply-driven – for instance, if 
the government pays salaries in cash (and particularly if this is financed by borrowing from the central 
bank) – there may be excess supply. In this case, the population will try to get rid of excess holdings, 
either by depositing in banks if they pay interest (and so increasing the level of banks’ free reserves), or 
buying goods or foreign exchange (both of which will tend to be inflationary).
The demand for cash will vary not only in relation to nominal GDP, but also to the level of interest rates 
(the opportunity cost of holding cash will change), development in non-cash payment systems
(substitutes for cash), the perceived soundness of the banking system (the risk of substitutes), and the 
credibility of the central bank (affecting the level of dollarisation, if any
24), including the level of trust in 
domestic cash (the risk of counterfeiting will reduce willingness to hold it). 
Demand for required reserves ‘Demand’ for required reserves is essentially a function of administrative
decisions by the central bank rather than reflecting a functional need; although when reserve averaging 
is allowed and especially when those reserves are remunerated, the requirement may not constitute an 
effective constraint on the banks
25.   If required reserves are not fully remunerated and are set at a high 
level, or if there are different levels for different commercial bank liabilities (eg varying between current 
and time deposits, or domestic and foreign currency deposits), they may provoke changes in the banks’ 
behaviour, or disintermediation of the banking system, in order to reduce the burden. 
Demand for contractual (voluntary) reserves will exist if such reserves are remunerated, and can be 
used by banks for liquidity management via averaging – for example, as planned in the Bank of 
England’s money market reforms
26.
Demand for free reserves Banks also usually need to hold free deposits at the central bank for 
settlement purposes, as the government and other clearing banks typically demand payment in reserve 
money, rather than in balances with a commercial bank which bear credit risk: payments between banks 
are usually settled by transfers between accounts at the central bank. As free reserves are not normally
fully remunerated, they tend to be held at a minimum by commercial banks.  That minimum may be 
24 If there is a perceived risk of substantial devaluation or high inflation, domestic reserve money may no longer be seen as 
the ‘ultimate’ or safe means of payments. Foreign currencies – or sometimes even forms of barter – may be substituted.
25 For instance, if reserve requirement levels are low, vault cash counts towards reserve requirements and reserve balances
can be used intraday for payment system purposes, then a bank’s operational need for vault cash and settlement balances
may exceed the reserve requirement. It is then no longer an effective, or “binding”, constraint to the extent it does not change
the bank’s behaviour.
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26 The Bank of England’s plans for fully remunerated, voluntary reserves are an innovation, although they will be in some
respects similar to averaging around zero, with securities pre-pledged to the central bank. In both cases, the commercial
banks have some degree of freedom in choosing the level of contractual reserves/pre-pledged securities – and thus of
liquidity so provided – and the effective cost of holding and using such reserves is virtually zero. substantial, if liquidity management is difficult and the penalties of being in overdraft are high. To the 
extent there is a cost to holding them, excess free reserves will lead banks to take actions to try to reduce 
the cost. Such actions could include increasing lending, bidding for securities in the domestic market (so 
pushing down the yield), cutting deposit rates offered, or buying foreign exchange. Excess free reserves 
will typically be seen where the central bank’s balance sheet is asset driven: where there is a history 
(and perhaps still current practice) of monetary financing of the government; where the government is 
borrowing abroad to finance domestic expenditure, and sells the foreign exchange to the central bank; or 
where there is a managed or fixed exchange rate and current or capital inflows, forcing the central bank 
to make net purchases of foreign exchange and so create domestic liquidity as its counterpart. In balance 
sheet terms, this means that the asset items ‘net foreign exchange reserves’ and/or ‘net lending to 
government’ expand, with a counterpart liabilities expansion in commercial bank deposits. 
If reserves are remunerated at, or at close to, market rates, banks will choose to hold a certain level for 
liquidity management purposes. Commercial bank current accounts (Exchange Settlement account) held 
at the Reserve Bank of Australia, and remunerated at 25bp below the official policy rate, are used in a 
way similar to voluntary reserve averaging. 
The level of free reserves will be affected from day to day by net transactions between the economy and 
the state sector (the government plus central bank).  For instance, if the banking system has to buy 
foreign exchange from the central bank to satisfy customer demand, or if net payments are due to the 
government (eg on tax payment days), the banking system may start the day with the desired minimum
level of free reserves, but still need to borrow from the central bank in order to make the required 
payments. Such demand may net to zero over time; but from day to day can result in substantial net 
flows in either direction. In RTGS payment systems there will also be demand for intraday liquidity, for 
payment system purposes; but this does not affect the end-of-day balance sheet of the central bank. 
Liquidity draining operations are a sub-set of monetary operations, and are covered in detail later. They 
may simply take the form of deposits at the central bank, or could involve the sale of securities. 
The central bank’s main assets - the counterpart of reserve money - are net holdings of foreign exchange 
(net foreign assets), net lending to the government, and lending to banks. 
Net foreign exchange reserves will be built up if the central bank buys foreign currency in the market or 
from the government, or if the government ‘gifts’ them to the central bank (as part of its capital, for 
instance). They may be substantial if a substantial part of the government’s income is in foreign 
21exchange (whether current earnings, donor flows, or borrowing
27), or if there are private sector current 
or capital inflows and the central bank wants to prevent too much appreciation of the exchange rate. In 
some countries, foreign exchange reserves on the central bank’s balance sheet will be offset by foreign 
exchange liabilities, and they may not all be freely available to the central bank. For instance, if the 
central bank manages a stabilisation fund for the government and this is shown on balance sheet, part of 
the foreign exchange assets may effectively belong to the government rather than to the central bank. 
But a substantial asset-driven build-up of net foreign exchange reserves – eg because the central bank 
has to buy and hold the foreign exchange in order to meet an exchange rate target – is likely to be 
associated with an offsetting expansion in reserve money, and in particular in excess free reserves unless 
the central bank takes off-setting liquidity-draining action. 
Net lending to government, as a net asset, is becoming less common globally, as the trend towards 
central bank independence is accompanied by a ‘no monetary financing’ rule – ie central banks do not 
lend, or at least do not extend new loans, to government. In some cases, limited short-term lending to 
government is permitted
28. In some cases it is unconstrained, and if used in an uncontrolled way will 
cause monetary management problems for the central bank. Monetary financing constitutes asset-driven 
expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet. Often, such asset-driven holdings carry a sub-market
interest rate, and cannot easily be used in monetary operations. But a holding of government securities 
need not be asset driven: many central banks will buy and sell government securities in order to 
influence the composition and level of their other assets and liabilities.
Even if the government has positive net domestic currency balances at the central bank, there will still 
be day-to-day fluctuations in the balances – as it spends money, or receives tax income – and these will 
impact reserve money, and in particular banks’ free reserves held with the central bank. Normally a 
central bank will aim to structure its operations such that the commercial banks’ free reserves at the end 
of each day, or the average end-of-day figure in a maintenance period, is in line with those banks’ 
demand. Too much or too little will have an adverse impact on the price of money (short-term interest 
rates or the exchange rate). Intraday flows may also be important, especially if the market is not certain 
they will be offset by central bank action. 
Lending to banks is a counterpart to liability-driven changes in the central bank’s balance sheet. 
Normally it will only occur in volume if the market as a whole has a structural shortage of liquidity, and 
 For instance, a 1997 agreement between the Reserve Bank of India and the government permits a fixed amount of lending,
at the bank rate; any excess is both time-limited and subject to a penal interest rate. 
27 For instance, oil exporters will see an increase in income when the world oil price rises; some poor countries see large – in
relation to GDP – donor flows eg Malawi, Uganda; and some governments finance domestic expenditure by foreign
borrowing.
28
22needs to borrow from the central bank to meet the economy’s demand for cash, or the banking system’s
demand for central bank balances. Occasionally it might be driven by a specific need eg if an individual 
bank runs into difficulties and the central bank provides some finance. The central bank will not try to
rce loans on the market, nor should the market seek more than it needs. 
iv: Using the central bank’s balance sheet 









 - liquidity draining operations 
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crease in interest rates towards the credit SF rate if the central bank takes no offsetting action.
Perhaps the key insight here is that if a central bank’s liquidity management is effective, so that the 
actual level of reserves is in line with demand without the need for any significant resort to standing 
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If free (i.e. freely available for the banks’ use) reserves are remunerated at a varying margin below the 
central bank’s policy rate, the banking system’s demand for free reserves may, in theory, increase when 
the spread declines, and decrease when it increases
29, as the opportunity cost of holding these reserves 
will change. If the banks’ demand for free reserves is constant (at current interest rates) and the central 
bank wants to keep interest rates unchanged, it needs to perform operations – via net lending to the 
banking system - so as to leave the banks’ free reserves unchanged.  If not, it can be seen from equation 
2 above that an increase in the supply sources of money and/or a reduction in the demand for notes or 
required or contractual reserves will result over time in an increase in free reserves and a corresponding 
decline in short-term interest rates (and/or weakening of the exchange rate). This is notably the case if
the banks have surplus liquidity. A surplus will result in short-term rates drifting down to the SF deposit 
rate or, in the absence of such a facility, to zero. Conversely, a reduction in the supply sources of money
or an increase in the demand for notes or required reserves will result in a decline in free reserves
in
23
29 Demand may be affected by other factors e.g. enhancements to the payment system may reduce banks’ need for
precautionary settlement balances. Banks will be more prepared to invest in liquidity management or payment systems if the 
identifiable cost savings are larger.facilities, it will be in a strong position to control the price of short-term money. Liquidity management
is an essential part of monetary operations – not because the central bank is in any way following a 
volume target, but simply because if supply at the policy rate does not meet demand – whether it is too 
high or too low -  the price in the market will move towards one of the SF rates.
In any case, because the central bank cannot tightly control net lending to banks on a day to day basis 
nor, in many cases, lending to the government or intervention in the foreign exchange market, it cannot 
usually fix the supply of reserve money exogenously, even if it wanted to do so
30.  This is particularly 
true in the case of lending to banks if there is a market shortage. To withhold supply altogether would 
mean either that banks could not supply notes to customers, or that one or more banks might not be able 
to settle their obligations in the payment system – in both cases, at the risk of damaging the credibility 
of the banking sector and possibly generating financial instability. In the very short-term, a central bank 
will take an accommodative approach to the economy’s demand for liquidity, and use the price of 
money to influence future demand. Its monetary policy control levers must therefore be price rather than 
volume oriented. 
A central bank can, for instance, limit supply in its OMO operations, forcing banks to increase 
borrowing at the more expensive SF credit rate, and thus pushing market rates up (in the case of a 
market shortage; or allowing rates to drift down to the SF deposit rate, in the case of a market surplus). 
This might be expected over time to lead to reduced demand for reserve money whether because the 
effective increase in interest rates slows loan demand, and lower balance sheet growth means lower 
growth in required reserves; or because slower GDP growth reduces demand for transactional cash. This 
is an approach that in the past has been used by many central banks. However, if the central bank’s 
monetary policy judgement is that there is a need to increase the level of interest rates, it would be more
transparent to change its policy rate, rather than to force the market to borrow varying amounts at two 
different rates (the policy rate and the SF rate). In stable market conditions, the policy rate can be 
reviewed at regular intervals – eg monthly as in the UK and the euro area – and operations simply
implement that policy. The operations themselves do not send a signal. In more volatile market
conditions, there may be more ‘news’ to which the central bank needs to react at frequent, but irregular, 
intervals. It may be more difficult in such conditions to have a clear separation between policy decisions 
taken regularly and publicly announced, on the one hand, and daily operations on the other. But in 
general, the more the two are separated, the clearer will be the policy signal. 
exchange rate there should not be any changes in net foreign assets (other than revaluation effects, which do not add to the
flow of reserve money).
30 There are exceptions. In some countries, the impact of government cash flows on the central bank’s balance sheet are 
neutralised with the debt agency conducting offsetting operations with the financial markets (e.g. Canada and the U.K. – see 
chapter 4 for further details on U.K. government cash management). Moreover, for countries which have a purely floating
24v: Shortage or surplus 
leave the excess
a current account with the central bank; or could try to switch into foreign exchange.
tanding the root cause of the surplus may
elp in determining who should bear the cost of addressing it.
the
ehest of the central bank, or will not want to do so beyond a certain level. Some will not do so at all. 
Most central banks would prefer to operate with a structural shortage of market liquidity, although in 
practice most face a surplus.  A shortage forces the banking system to borrow from the central bank, so 
that the central bank can enforce its desired level of interest rates: the banking system has no choice but to 
participate in central bank lending operations, as the central bank is the monopoly supplier of needed 
reserve money. The banks can underbid OMOs, but will then need to use SF borrowing to cover the 
residual shortage; as this will be at a penal rate, such behaviour is unlikely to persist. By contrast, if the 
banking sector has a surplus of liquidity, it does not have to participate in liquidity-withdrawing
operations by the central bank eg deposit auctions or sales of securities. It could simply
in
There are also balance sheet implications. If the market is short, the central bank receives interest on its 
lending to the banks, but where there is a surplus, the central bank has to pay interest if it is to drain 
excess liquidity. This may – and in practice frequently does - make a central bank reluctant to tighten the 
policy stance when necessary. There is always a cost to draining a surplus, or switching from a structural 
surplus to a deficit – in a sense, the cost is the counterpart to past or current policy decisions on 
government financing or exchange rate management. Unders
h
Reserve requirements could be increased to offset a market surplus; but this would only benefit the central 
bank if they are not fully remunerated. In this case, the cost of draining would be imposed on the 
economy, intermediated via the banking system
31. Generally, this is an inefficient way of covering the 
cost, because of the impact on the economy as a whole. In some countries, the Ministry of Finance may
agree to issue domestic currency securities and leave them on deposit with the central bank. This does not 
avoid the cost of draining, it simply means that the central bank does not pay it. There are benefits to this 
route: the central bank’s balance sheet will be stronger, and it is less likely to feel constrained in monetary
policy implementation. But Ministries of Finance will sometimes be reluctant to issue securities at
b
The central bank could run deposit auctions, or issue its own securities. The National Bank of Poland 
has been an example of the latter
32:  from 1995 to 2000 (when the exchange rate peg was dropped) it 
31
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 Although often referred to as a tax on the banking system, the banks will of course adjust their interest rate structure in 
order to pass on the cost.
32 Due mainly to sterilization of heavy capital inflows, and monetization of government spending before the enactment of the
National Bank of Poland Act in 1997. issued central bank bills to reduce the structural surplus, and from 2000 began to sell government
securities from its portfolio.  An alternative, for some central banks, might be to sell foreign exchange. 
Again, this does not eliminate the cost of draining the surplus; but if the securities or foreign exchange 
are sold at a market rate (and provided any impact on market rates does not run counter to other 
policies), no policy signal should be sent through the long-term drain of liquidity. Further information
on surplus liquidity can be found in the CCBS Lecture Series No 3 “Surplus Liquidity: Implications for 
Central Banks”. 
264 LIQUIDITY FORECASTING 
A central bank will need to conduct open market operations in each maintenance period (whether that is 
a day or a month) in order to keep its tactical target stable (unless it is operating a pegged exchange rate, 
when standing facility operating at the policy rate will suffice).  In order to do this efficiently the central 
bank needs a reasonably accurate forecast of the factors (the main items on its balance sheet) affecting 
the banks’ free reserves within the maintenance period.  In a system where reserve requirements apply 
on average over a period, say two weeks or one month, or where the banking system can access short-
term lending and deposit facilities at the central bank without too large a penalty, small and temporary
33
autonomous shocks to the banks’ liquidity can be absorbed
34 without the need for daily OMO.  But 
whether the maintenance period is a day or a month; and whether the operating target is interest rates or 
the exchange rate, the central bank needs to be able to forecast its balance sheet within the maintenance
period if it is to be able to control market conditions accurately. 
With an accurate liquidity forecast it is possible to announce both the expected quantity (i.e. the market’s
needs) and the price (set by the central bank/government) of the central bank’s operations.  This does not 
mean that the central bank can necessarily fix both the price and the quantity of its transactions with the 
market. If OMO supply is equal to or less than demand, it can fix both (goods can be sold below the 
market-clearing price as long as there is no need to clear the market). What a central bank cannot do is to 
fix arbitrarily both the price and the volume of OMO without altering the relationship between its lever 
(the OMO) and its tactical target (the short-term market interest rate, or the market exchange rate). This is 
evident in countries where there is excess liquidity and the central bank is reluctant to drain all the excess 
at a market clearing price, because of the impact on its profit & loss. A certain volume of deposits can be 
taken, or securities sold, at the ‘policy’ rate; but if this leaves excess liquidity in the market, the market
rate will drop below the OMO rate. 
The level of market demand for OMO transactions with the central bank will vary depending on the 
perceived accuracy of the central bank’s forecast, and the spread between OMO and SF rates. If a bank is 
confident that it does not need to borrow, and is doubtful of the quality of the forecast, it will be less 
likely to participate in an OMO; but if it is uncertain of its own needs but trusts the central bank forecast, 
it may participate in the expectation that it can on-lend any funds that prove to be surplus to requirements.
33 In this context, ‘small’ is in relation to the normal level of banks’ reserves; and ‘temporary’ means they are expected to
unwind before the end of the current reserve maintenance period.
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34 Allowing banks to meet reserve requirements on average over the maintenance period implicitly acknowledges that the 
central bank is not concerned about short-term fluctuations in the level of reserve money.Or if the opportunity cost of failure to borrow enough (the difference between the OMO and the SF rate) 
is high, banks may be more inclined to participate in OMO and risk holding excess balances (although 
this may be inefficient for the system as a whole). 
In developed economies, the central bank will typically aim to forecast the liquidity needs of the market
and provide the required amount.   This liquidity provision is often carried out through counterparties who 
are obliged to distribute liquidity through the system.  In order to forecast the amount of liquidity needed, 
the central bank needs to forecast net expected flows between the central bank/government
35 and the 
market, such as government security purchases/redemptions; government revenues (e.g. taxes) and 
expenditure (e.g. health, education, welfare etc); maturing money market transactions; net purchase of 
notes/coins by commercial banks from the central bank; and central bank intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. These are commonly referred to as ‘autonomous factors’ – because they are beyond the 
direct control of the central bank. The list is not exhaustive but gives an idea of the flows that are taken 
into account in the forecast.  The most volatile element is normally the government revenue/expenditure, 
as it is often difficult to assess exactly when this will be booked, and if the central bank is operating on a 
daily basis, this can result in late swings to the forecast on a daily basis.   In the U.K., (and e.g. in 
Australia and Japan) the forecast, and its main components, is published. The ECB publishes a forecast of 
the change in the autonomous factors for the maintenance period.
For some central banks, it is difficult to forecast liquidity, often because the flows of government revenue 
and expenditure are unpredictable or even unknown until after the event.  In such circumstances, the 
central bank may simply ask commercial banks to advise them of their individual liquidity requirements.
This may also happen if the interbank market does not function efficiently and therefore it is not possible 
to meet the system’s needs through a small number of counterparties. 
An alternative to asking banks directly would be to attempt to model the liquidity needs of the system.
This technique can be used for the currency demands of the banking system, as they often follow a 
predictable pattern intra-week and through the year
36.  The Bank of England is continuing to develop 
improved modelling techniques for its notes in circulation forecast.  However, for components such as 
government cashflows and net foreign assets, due to the large degree of discretion, and to seasonal 
fluctuations, and uncertainties within this, modelling techniques are less widely used. 
35 Assuming the government banks at the central bank.
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36 The demand for notes typically rises towards the end of the week and then unwinds at the start of the following week. 
Through the year, demand for notes is likely to increase ahead of public holidays such as Easter and Christmas and bank
holidays and unwind following these holidays.An example of the Bank of England’s published liquidity forecast: 
9:45 am Initial liquidity forecast Stg xxxx mn shortage. 
A round of fixed rate operations is invited. The Bank's repo rate is xxxx%. 
The operations will comprise repos to xxxxxxxxxxxxx. 
Principal factors in the forecast: 
Maturing repo -xxxx 
Bank/Customer transactions xxx 
Rise/Fall in note circulation xxxxx 
Maturing settlement bank late repo facility -xxx 
Bankers balances above/below target xxx
9:50 am Total amount allotted - Stg xxxx mn.
2:30 pm Liquidity forecast revision Stg xxxx mn. Residual shortage Stg xxxx mn.
A round of fixed rate operations is invited. The Bank's repo rate is xxxx%. 
The operations will comprise repos to xxxxxxxxxxxxx.
2:35 pm Total amount allotted - Stg xxxx mn.
3:30 pm Residual shortage - Stg xxxxx mn.
A round of overnight repo operations to supply funds is invited at a rate of xxxx%. 
Deposit facility:  offers of overnight funds are invited at a rate of xxxx%.
3:35 pm Total amount allotted in overnight repo operations - Stg xxx mn.
No use has been made of the deposit facility. Amount allotted to the deposit facility - Stg xxx mn.
Net flows of overnight funds to/from the market - Stg xxx mn.
Total liquidity provided to the market - Stg xxx mn.
4:20 pm Final liquidity forecast revision Stg xxxx mn.
Residual shortage Stg xxxx mn./No liquidity forecast revision. 
The settlement bank late repo facility is available./The settlement bank late repo facility will not operate
today
4:30 pm
Stg xxxx mn has been provided in the settlement bank late repo facility.
The above forecast is that used in early 2006, ahead of the introduction of the new operational system,
and is for the current day only. This will obviously change once reserve averaging over a one-month
period is introduced. The example below of the ECB’s liquidity statement provides information on the 
reserve requirement for the whole maintenance period, average holding to date, and a forecast of 
autonomous factors for the coming week (rather than to the end of the current maintenance period). As 
the euro-area commercial banks as a group typically hold reserves close to the required level throughout 
the maintenance period, the ESCB can aim to provide sufficient liquidity to offset the current week’s 
autonomous factors, allowing within-period averaging to offset any errors between the forecast and the 
outturn for that week. 
29 Example of the ECB publication on market liquidity 
. Daily liquidity conditions (EUR millions)
Reserve maintenance period:  08/02/2006 to 07/03/2006
Average reserve requirements: 157,663
Figures as at  22/02/2006
Average current acc. holdings in the MP:  158,169
Current account holdings:  157,528
Use of the marginal lending facility: 0
Use of the deposit facility: 32
Autonomous factors:  250,458
Forecasts of autonomous factors (EUR millions)
Estimate on 21/02/2006 of average daily autonomous factors for the period 20/02/2006 to
27/02/2006: 253,400
Allowing reserve averaging can aid the central bank in coping with the volatility in the autonomous
factors.  While the central bank still needs to forecast the market’s liquidity position accurately over the 
maintenance period, the market does not need to meet a particular liquidity target on a day-to-day basis 
during the period, thereby reducing the need for forecasting autonomous factors on a day-by-day basis, 
and giving the market more flexibility in liquidity management.
Regarding government cashflows themselves, the central bank’s forecasting ability can be improved
through effective communication, not just with the Ministry of Finance (MoF), but also the individual 
government departments.  Often MoF officials are not located in the revenue and expenditure departments
and hence have little control over the timing, size and method of the cashflows.  Furthermore, while many
MoFs and government departments concentrate on monthly and annual totals, for liquidity forecasting it 
is the daily pattern of cash flows that is important.  As such, many central banks have taken steps to 
improve the predictability of these cashflows by asking for a timetable of revenue and expenditure flows – 
preferably broken down on a daily basis – to be provided to them by the MoF / relevant government
departments.  In most countries, income tax flows follow a pre-specified schedule, though the profiles for 
corporation tax and value-added-tax may be more volatile.  Some central banks require prior notification
when there is a large transfer or when there is a significant and planned variance from the timetable.  In 
some countries, there is an agreed target balance for the government’s account with the central bank
37,
while in others, the central bank has the right to shift at its discretion the government’s funds from their 
books to those of the commercial banks.
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37 This is useful for central bank liquidity management providing the time period that the government has to meet its target
balance matches the central bank’s maintenance period.Encouraging the government to bank with the commercial sector, through for example paying a below 
market rate of interest on deposits, would eliminate the impact of government cashflows on the central 
bank balance sheet, thereby enforcing the separation of monetary operations and government cash 
management.  In South Africa, with the government’s account at the central bank unremunerated,
balances on the account are relatively small.  Instead the majority of the government’s funds are kept with 
the commercial banks: liquidity management is greatly enhanced as the bulk of the government’s money
is kept outside the central bank.  This was also the case in Germany, pre euro, as the Bundesbank could 
not remunerate any deposits.  However it is rare for the government’s main accounts to be held outside of 
the central bank: the protection and non-commercial neutrality of the central bank act as a strong 
attraction.
With effect from April 2000, U.K. government cash management was transferred from the Bank of 
England to the UK Debt Management Office (DMO).   The motive behind this was predominantly to 
clarify the roles of the Bank of England and HM Treasury and so avoid any perception of conflicts of 
interest in market operations conducted by these institutions, as the Bank has had responsibility for 
monetary policy since 1997, while a Treasury agency (the DMO) is responsible for debt management.
The DMO operates in the market on a daily basis in order to offset government flows to and from the 
market, like the treasury department of a large commercial company.  In effect this means that changes 
in the central bank balance sheet item ‘net lending to government’ are expected to be zero on a day-to-
day basis, considerably facilitating the forecast of autonomous factors.  The DMO manages this first 
through a weekly Treasury bill programme (rough-tuning) and then through daily fine-tuning market
operations which are conducted on a bilateral basis with set counterparties, predominantly through the 
domestic-currency U.K. government bond (gilt) repo market.   The DMO would therefore plan to run 
down the Treasury bill stock in months of positive cash flows to the government and then increase it in 
months of higher net government expenditure.  The DMO and Bank of England work to avoid any 
conflicts between their respective objectives.  The Bank continues to set short-term interest rates: the 
DMO is a rate taker in its market operations.
315 MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS - OVERVIEW 
vi:  Direct controls 
Direct controls are becoming ever more rare, essentially because they do not work well, if at all. They 
are typically directives given by the central bank to control the quantity or price (interest rate) of money
deposited with commercial banks (and sometimes other financial institutions) and credit provided by 
them; and perhaps also to control the exchange rate used in transactions with banks.  Ceilings on the 
growth of bank lending or deposits are examples of quantity controls.  Maximum bank lending or 
deposit rates, or official exchange rates, are examples of price rate controls. Such controls do not utilise 
the central bank’s balance sheet. 
There are a number of major disadvantages of direct controls, related to the constraint they impose on 
market development and the fact that they become less effective over time as loopholes are found: 
they may prevent economically justifiable transactions e.g. a company may be willing to pay above 
the maximum rate to finance a profitable transaction, and a bank may be willing to lend, but controls 





bank-by-bank controls hold back competition in financial markets which could benefit both 
borrowers and depositors.  For example, they prevent competition from allowing more efficient
banks to expand their deposits and credit by offering higher deposit rates and lower lending rates; 
selective credit controls - credit controls on some banks but not on favoured ones (for instance on 
banks that lend to specific sectors or regions) - distort markets and impose a cost on the economy
which may not be quantified.
direct controls encourage disintermediation into non-controlled (so-called “grey”) markets or 
abroad.  So, over time, direct controls become less effective as lenders and savers search for ways to 
circumvent them.  For example, in an increasingly open and integrated world financial system,
companies and households could borrow from abroad, thus circumventing controls at home. In other 
words, they may control statistics, but not actual economic behaviour. 
The advantages normally cited in support of direct controls are that they can be an effective way for the 
central bank to control the price or maximum quantity of bank credit, particularly in a temporary crisis; 
32and they may constitute the most effective, rapid or practicable approach in circumstances of very 
underdeveloped financial markets, or where the central bank has inadequate techniques of indirect 
monetary control, or in a crisis situation. Some central banks have experimented with exchange controls 
as a short-term measure to control capital flows, and thus affect liquidity and its pricing, but it is hard to 
point to any clear cases of success. This Handbook does not explore capital controls. 
Typically, the advantages, if any, of direct controls are of a short-term nature, and the disadvantages 
increase over time. They are not recommended.
vii: Indirect instruments 
An important reason for financial liberalisation is to develop a system which promotes an efficient 
allocation of savings and credit in the economy.  In the monetary area, financial liberalisation involves a 
movement away from direct monetary controls towards indirect ones.  The latter operate by the central 
bank controlling the price (or in theory the quantity) of the supply of its own liabilities - reserve money - 
which in turn may affect either (i) market interest rates and the quantity of money and credit in the 
whole banking system or (ii) the exchange rate. 
Instruments used in monetary operations are often divided into three basic types: 
o Open-Market Operations (OMOs), which are conducted at the initiative of the central 
bank but with voluntary participation by individual counterparties in the banking system;
OMOs may be conducted at pre-announced trading sessions (which could include 
auctions) or at any time of the central bank’s choosing.  Using OMOs the central bank 
either provides funds to the market by lending against collateral, through repo
38 or by 
buying assets (securities or foreign exchange), or withdraws funds from the market by 
taking deposits, by conducting reverse repo, or by selling assets (securities or foreign 
exchange).
o Standing Facilities (SFs), which are normally defined as borrowing or deposit facilities
available at the initiative of banks (and sometimes other financial institutions), usually 
within parameters set by the central bank; lending by the central bank is almost always 
collateralised. Standing facilities can be used to provide a safety value for the market’s
liquidity management: the credit facility allowing banks to borrow from the central bank, 
the deposit facility as an option for placing excess funds.
33
38 A sale and repurchase agreement.  See Handbook No. 16 (Repo of Government Securities) for more detail.  All references
to repo are from the directional point of view of the market counterparty (as opposed to the central bank). o Reserve Requirements, which can be used to alter the short-term demand for reserve 
money and thus the short-term interest rate (or possibly just the spread between deposit 
and lending rates), although they are somewhat imprecise and hence are regarded as a 
“rough tuning” instrument.  Since banks can adjust their balance sheets in response to 
reserve requirement changes, the longer-term effect may, rather, be on the degree of 
banking intermediation. Remuneration of reserve requirements, or the use of remunerated
voluntary reserves, removes their impact on interest rates. The addition of reserve 
averaging transforms them into a form of non-penal standing facility, by allowing banks 
to manage short-term liquidity shocks at their initiative. 
Most central banks in developed market economies use a mix of all three.  Normally, the rate structure 
of OMOs and SFs is used to steer market prices (short-term interest rates, or the exchange rate). Fully-
remunerated reserves do not have a price impact; and where there are not fully remunerated (as in most
countries), they are not normally used actively to steer interest rates.
If both types of SF are available and are set for the same maturity (normally overnight), a corridor will 
be created with the lending rate setting an upper ceiling to short-term market rates, the deposit rate the 
floor.  The central bank will need to consider the width of this corridor carefully (i.e. how penal it 
should set the interest rates on the facilities with respect to its OMO rate).  A wider corridor (i.e. 
facilities with significantly penal interest rates) will encourage market participants use the money
market, or to increase holdings of voluntary reserves, and use the facilities only as a last resort.  The 
trade-off to this may be undue interest rate volatility at this maturity because of market imperfections;
and to some extent, this volatility will feed through along the yield curve.
Some countries have given standing facilities a greater prominence in guiding the short term interest 
rate structure.  Australia, Canada and New Zealand and more recently the U.K. operate with a narrow 
corridor (50 basis points) standing ready to deal with their counterparties on demand at both the upper 
and lower rates.
In many countries, the OMO does not play a significant role in guiding interest rates either because poor 
liquidity forecasting makes it hard to use effectively, or because there is surplus liquidity in the market
and the central bank is reluctant to pay the full cost of draining it. In this case, one of the SF rates will 
tend to guide market rates: where the market has a structural surplus of liquidity, this will be the deposit 
SF rate, since that is the one banks most expect to use. Market rates will at times jump to the SF credit 
rate; the resultant volatility can discourage market development, because of the uncertainty involved. 
34Importantly, all three instruments can support short-run liquidity management. In developed markets,
central banks will typically use a combination of OMOs and reserve averaging to support liquidity 
management, with SFs acting as a safety valve. These mechanisms help to smooth the impact of 
liquidity flows on short-term market rates, and allow the central bank’s policy rate to have a clearer and 
stronger effect.  In a number of developed countries the trend has been to give increasing weight to 
reserve requirement averaging, as this allows banks to manage their own day-to-day liquidity position. 
Some countries also still use changes in the level of reserve requirements as a medium-term liquidity 
management tool, but this is increasingly unusual. 
356  OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
OMOs are a very flexible monetary instrument, and the involvement of individual institutions is on a 
voluntary rather than compulsory basis
39.  OMOs can be performed frequently and in any quantity and are 
therefore a useful method of liquidity and short-term interest rate management.  They help to foster 
financial competition and market development.  However, most OMOs are in fact no longer conducted in 
the open market. Historically many central banks did conduct operations in the market, at market prices 
and on a bilateral basis; the policy rate was that applicable to a discount, or Lombard facility (a credit SF), 
which was above market rates.  Nowadays, OMOs tend to be set-piece multilateral operations conducted 
with a pre-determined group of counterparties and at or close to a policy rate. 
viii: Primary securities markets 
OMOs can in principle be performed in the primary securities market, through new issues of short-term
government or central bank bills
40 to withdraw liquidity (issuing less than the volume maturing, on roll-
over, will increase market liquidity).  Using government securities will require the appropriate level of co-
ordination between the central bank and the government debt manager, as the same instrument in the same
(primary) market is being used for both monetary and debt management. Co-ordination is needed because 
the timing of government debt sales required to finance fully the budget deficit will not necessarily be 
consistent with the central bank’s liquidity management needs. On the other hand, while issuing central 
bank bills will help to promote the independence of the central bank, there will be the associated issuance 
costs
41. Some commentators suggest that they may further hamper market development as the existence of 
both central bank and government securities may split thin liquidity even further and cause confusion for 
investors who may struggle to price the relative creditworthiness of the two types of securities.  But this 
argument may not hold: no central bank would suggest that the private sector should not issue securities 
on the grounds that this would fragment the liquidity of existing government securities. And if the 




periodically.  Nevertheless if draining liquidity leads to a central bank loss, it could affect the central bank’s independence.
 Although as has been noted, the Bank of England intends to introduce reserve holdings on a voluntary basis.
 Domestic-currency liabilities of the government (treasury bonds or bills) or the central bank (central bank bills) are 
homogenous and normally carry little credit risk and hence are the instruments most commonly used in OMOs in developing 
financial markets.
41 The central bank rather than the government incurs the direct interest rate cost of bill issue though it will earn interest on 
the counterpart assets on its balance sheet.   Although presentationally this will reduce the central bank’s profits, the final
cost is still borne by the government to the extent that central bank profits are normally remitted to the government
36A potential drawback with the use of primary market sales of securities, particularly government
securities, is that they will tend to have a longer maturity than ideally used for monetary policy 
perations, and it may therefore be difficult to use them for interest-rate setting. They can still be used for 
management.
ix: Secondary markets 
market operations are defined to include deposits and collateralised lending, outright 
ansactions in suitable assets, repurchase agreements (repos) using securities, and foreign exchange 
he relevant security or foreign currency should not, then, be 
ffected by the money-market operation
42.
ations, thereby exploiting a wider pool of collateral 
o
rough tuning liquidity
While primary markets are the more common channel in the early stages of financial liberalisation, 
secondary markets become the market of choice once they have been established.  Secondary markets
offer the central bank greater flexibility – dealing can be on a secured basis in either direction - and 
operating in this market may boost market liquidity.  Secondary market operations (and standing
facilities) can make use of private sector paper - in a few countries there is little choice, as there are 
insufficient government securities available, or they may be held by long-term investors rather than banks 




For operations in the secondary market, an important distinction exists between, on the one hand, 
transactions which are later reversed (repo, foreign exchange swaps, deposits, collateralised loans) or 
which use very short-dated securities, and, on the other, outright transactions involving longer-dated 
securities or foreign exchange.  The initial money-market effects - the injection or withdrawal of liquidity
- are the same in each case; but the wider effects differ.  If a transaction is to be reversed - whether by re-
sale of a security or foreign exchange, or return of collateral on repayment of a loan - the underlying
exposure of the banking sector to the relevant securities or foreign currency is not affected by the money-
market transaction.  The market price of t
a
By contrast, the outright purchase or sale of longer-dated securities or foreign exchange does affect the 
underlying exposure of the banking sector to those assets, and is likely therefore to affect their market
price.  In other words, outright transactions of this sort may affect prices in the securities or foreign
exchange markets, as well as money market liquidity.  While this may happen to coincide with desired 
policy changes – for instance if the central bank is managing the exchange rate - often it will not do so. 
Central banks consequently tend to favour collateralised loans, repos or swaps when using longer-dated 
securities or foreign exchange for monetary oper
without directly affecting those particular markets.
37x: Broad categories of Open Market Operations 
The economy’s need for central bank liabilities tends to increase over time, reflecting the increased 
demand for cash as consumer prices and real incomes grow.  This increase in long-term demand may be 
met by the central bank either increasing the amount of revolving short-term lending (as the U.K. does at 
present, though this is under review), or periodically making outright purchases of longer-dated securities 
(as the US Federal Reserve Bank does), or by purchasing foreign currency outright. 
When the banking system has a temporary shortage of reserves (i.e. is in need of liquidity), the central 
bank has a number of options as to how it might provide liquidity to the market through OMO.  It could:- 
x provide collateralised loans to the banks with a relatively short maturity;
x purchase outright short-dated securities or foreign exchange; 
x offer repo transactions
43 where the central bank buys securities (with original maturities of any length) 
from the banks with an agreement for their resale at a specified price at a given future date; 
x undertake short-dated foreign exchange swaps; the central bank purchases foreign exchange from the 
banks against domestic currency with an agreement for resale at a specified price (exchange rate) at a 
given date in the near future. 
When the banks have a temporary excess of reserves, the central bank may:
x invite banks to place short-term remunerated deposits with the central bank;
x sell outright very short-term bills or foreign exchange; 
x undertake reverse repos, the central bank selling securities with an agreement to buy them back at a 
specified price on a specified date; 
x undertake short-dated foreign exchange swaps; the central bank initially sells foreign currency and 
purchases domestic currency. 
Foreign exchange is still widely used in developing and transitional economies where domestic-currency
markets may be less well developed, although of course its use depends on the availability of foreign 
exchange in the first place. It may be preferable to use swap or repo transactions rather than outrights, 
because of the spill-over into the foreign exchange market (foreign exchange cash may be swapped and 
foreign-exchange denominated securities repo’d; the money market effect is the same).  The pricing of a 
swap transaction should ideally be based on the same central bank intervention rate as used in other 
42 The fact that central banks typically conduct repo transactions under General Collateral (as opposed to a “Special”) is
another reason why the transaction does not affect the underlying price of the specific security.
38operations. There is an additional consideration in countries which are partially dollarised: if foreign 
currency can be used in a similar way to the domestic currency, then a foreign exchange transaction will 
not have so much effect on overall transactional liquidity. Outright transactions will affect the exchange 
rate, and this may be desired. But swaps may be pointless from a monetary policy point of view
44.
As will be seen later, every one of these types of transaction can be used for standing facilities as well as 
for OMO. The difference will be seen in: who takes the initiative? Is the transaction priced at the policy 
rate or at a margin above or below it? And is the transaction multilateral (eg an auction, as is the case for 
almost all OMOs), or bilateral (as SF transactions must be)? 
xi: Maturity of OMO 
The central bank should consider whether or not it wishes to adjust the market’s liquidity on a temporary
or permanent basis.  If the central bank wishes to adjust the market’s liquidity position on a permanent
basis (a structural shift), then outright transactions in foreign exchange or long-dated securities would be 
more suitable than repo, collateralised loans and foreign exchange swaps, all of which are designed for 
temporary (and reversible) adjustments to the market’s liquidity position.  One can distinguish then 
between short-term monetary operations which aim to affect short-term interest rates or the exchange rate 
and help liquidity management; and longer-term liquidity management operations, where the central bank 
is managing liquidity but not normally sending an interest-rate signal. As noted earlier, it is very unusual 
for central banks to seek to set interest rates much beyond a two-week maturity, and so unusual to use 
longer-term operations to influence interest rates. 
There is a more important reason for keeping the maturity of operations relatively short. Longer-term rate-
setting operations can dilute the impact of monetary policy decisions, and confuse the yield curve. 
Normally, a central bank will want any change in policy rates to affect the cost of its transactions with the 
market from the date of the decision, and to determine the yield curve until the date of the next scheduled 
policy meeting. Ideally, if the group which sets monetary policy (the MPC in the UK, the Governing 
Council in the euro area) meets once a month, then operations undertaken in between meetings should not 
significantly overlap the next meeting (and the reserve maintenance period should ideally be aligned with 
the policy meetings). If the market believes that the central bank will only adjust its policy stance at 
scheduled policy meetings, then the yield curve out to the next policy meeting should be flat. Beyond that, 
the market may speculate about possible future rate changes, for instance depending on its forecast for 
inflation. If the central bank conducts long-term interest-rate setting operations, and the banks think rates 
43 Here and elsewhere, repo operations are seen from the viewpoint of the commercial banks, so that a repo means the 
commercial bank sells the security to the central bank, in the first leg.
44 Swaps may nevertheless be useful as a standing facility. 
39will rise, they will want to borrow as much long-term money as possible and deposit surplus liquidity 
short-term, resulting in ‘pivoting’ where short-term rates can fall if the market expects the central bank to 
increase its rates. Or if the central bank is draining surplus liquidity, the banks may not participate in
perations, as they will not want to lock into low long-term rates ahead of an expected rate increase. 
the transaction. Thus, if the
PC rate rises during the life of an OMO, the OMO rate adjusts accordingly.
ss i x
onths; and there may be significant speculation in the banks’ use of the central bank’s operations.
xii:
ving one or more discrete or ad hoc deals, not announced 
advance and possibly unreported afterwards.
o
Longer-term price-setting monetary operations may result in the market’s participation in OMOs and use 
of SFs being influenced by speculation, giving rise to unwanted distortions in the short-term yield curve. 
Removing the scope of the banking system to use OMO speculatively should therefore result in clearer 
policy signals and more efficient markets. In 2004 Q1, the ECB introduced a series of changes to its 
existing MROs and wider operational framework in order to improve the efficiency of its operations. 
These changes included adjusting the dates of the maintenance period for minimum reserves so that they 
now always start on the settlement day of the MRO following the Governing Council meeting at which 
the monthly assessment of the monetary policy stance is scheduled.  This move was designed to help the 
banking system’s liquidity management by ensuring that the maturity of a MRO did not cross over into 
another maintenance period, and that only one policy rate was in force per maintenance period.  To 
support this, the maturity of each MRO was shortened from two weeks to one week. The Bank of 
England changed its operations in 2005, in order to prevent fixed-rate OMOs overlapping policy setting 
dates
45. In the interim, the Bank of England has countered the risk of pivoting by indexing the OMO rate 
to the MPC rate, rather than fixing it at the MPC rate prevailing at the start of
M
By contrast if, for example, a six month maturity is used for OMO, then at any one time the pricing of the 
central bank’s transactions with the market will reflect the range of policy rates set over the previou
m
Regular or irregular operations? 
A central bank may hold regular, set-piece operations, where it announces in advance a credit or deposit 
auction, and where a relatively large group - all banks or all members of a restricted group - may
participate on an equal basis; or irregular operations, undertaken often at short notice, in response to a 
perceived need. The latter may be sub-divided into irregular set-piece operations (similar to regular ones 
except in timing) and bilateral operations, invol
in
40
45 In the Bank of England’s planned reforms: “Beyond the next MPC meeting, money market rates should be determined by
what market participants expect the MPC to decide. Hence our objective is to have a basically flat curve, at the MPC’s rate, 
out to the next MPC meeting.” (Speech by Paul Tucker, July 2004.) (a) Regular operations 
Most central banks have a regular schedule of operations, since they anticipate a need to transact with 
the market at least once a week (certainly once in each maintenance period), and find it operationally 
impler to use a fixed time each week. 
ing system in 2006, when there were 
idespread market concerns about the availability of liquidity. 
e Governing Council) in mid 2000 to overcome the chronic 
verbidding that had developed
48.
In the U.S. on operating days (ie most business days) the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Fed) 
announces the operation to its primary dealers via the Trading Room Automated Processing System
(TRAPS) by around 9.30am; if this time passes, the market will know that the Fed will not operate that 
day.  If it is necessary to use more than one operation (e.g. if a longer-term repurchase operation is also 
required), then the Fed will run this first at around 8.20am.
Irregular operations may be conducted in a number of ways.  In some cases, bills are sold or purchased in 
response to unexpected short-term developments (shocks) to the economy.  By definition, these cannot be 
s
Currently in the U.K. a group of money-market counterparties may be invited up to twice a day, at pre-
determined times and publicly - on the wire services’ screens - to bid for re-finance funds.  They may
offer UK government securities or EEA government debt for short-term repo.  In both cases these are 
for same-day settlement.  These are “fine-tuning” operations.  (See Table 2). The Bank of England has 
also used longer-term repo operations at market rates to supply liquidity e.g. over the change over the 
year 2000
46 and in the run-up to the launch of the averag
w
The ECB conducts weekly
47 Main Refinancing Operations (MROs).  These operations play the principal 
role for the Eurosystem in steering interest rates, managing the market’s liquidity and signalling the 
stance of monetary policy.  In the MROs, the ECB provides liquidity through “reverse transactions” 
(either in the form of repo or collateralised loans) to its counterparties via tenders.  These tenders were 
changed from a fixed rate basis to that of a competitive rate tender (with a minimum bid rate equal to 
the ECB’s policy rate as set by th
o
(b) Irregular operations 
46 Provision of three-month liquidity indexed to the Bank’s repo rate (as opposed to the usual two-week fixed rate repos).
47 The variability in the frequency of regular OMOs conducted by central banks is a function of whether or not reserve 
averaging is employed; the maturity of the OMO; the volatility and size of the flows of the autonomous factors versus the
size of reserve requirements; and the extent to which the central bank wishes to eliminate short term interest rate volatility.
41
48 The ECB had previously set the rate and restricted the volume provided, leading to increasing overbidding by banks which
expected their bids to be pro-rated.planned in advance, and the central bank will wish to conduct the operations quickly.  This in turn 
suggests that the number of counterparties may need to be limited.
An example of this type of operation is the fine tuning operations of the ECB.   These “aim to manage the 
liquidity situation in the market and to steer interest rates, in particular in order to smooth the effects on 
interest rates caused by unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market”
49.  Their frequency and maturity
are not standardised, with liquidity provided through quick-tenders.  They might be used, for instance, at
e end of a maintenance period in order to prevent interest rates diverging too far from the policy rate. 
is offering funds in the interbank
arket, the central bank could take them, thus removing liquidity from the banking system.  Some
nd this may give it a competitive advantage.  If the central bank were to make regular use of
uch operations with a small group of counterparties, other banks might suspect the central bank of 
e most important tool for monetary policy.  However, since repo was introduced in 1998, in order to 
as replaced foreign exchange swaps as the major policy instrument.
th
On occasions, a surplus of liquidity is forecast for the U.K. banking system.  On these days, the Bank of 
England absorbs the excess liquidity through a competitive rate short-maturity reverse repo tender.
The quickest way for a central bank to affect money market liquidity is through a transaction with a single 
counterparty, whether in the money markets, the securities markets or the foreign exchange markets
(provided same day settlement is available).  For instance, if a bank
m
developed countries make occasional use of such irregular one-on-one operations. Indeed in the euro area, 
liquidity absorption is, in principle, executed via bilateral transactions. 
But, though quick and simple, there are disadvantages to bilateral operations.  Most importantly, not only 
are they not visible and may not be equitable, they may not distribute liquidity around the market as 
efficiently as a multilateral operation; and they lose the signalling impact (normally the most rapid). 
Moreover, in such operations the central bank’s counterparty has knowledge about the central bank’s 
actions (unless the latter can act anonymously through a broker) which is not available to the rest of the 
market, a
s
favouring the privileged few unfairly, and consequently become less willing to participate actively in the
market.
Foreign exchange transactions conducted for monetary policy purposes tend to fall into the category of 
irregular operations, in part because a central bank’s position in the foreign exchange market is rather 
different from its privileged position in its domestic markets; and it may be open to settlement risk in 
foreign exchange transactions - a risk which can be avoided in its domestic markets - and will therefore
take a different attitude to its counterparties.  In Switzerland, foreign exchange swaps were at one point 
th
broaden access to its operations, it h
42OMO tenders: price or quantity
Theory says that the central bank can either offer to inject/withdraw a fixed quantity of liquidity and allow 
the banking system to bid for the interest rate (using either a competitive price or a common price auction 
structure); or set the interest rate and allow the banks to determine the volume.  As indicated earlier, even 
if the central bank fixes the volume to be transacted, inviting the banks to bid the price, it is likely that the 
central bank does this with a view to the expected impact on prices bid; or that it gives a strong price 
guide, and will vary the volume allotted in line with its price target. The choice between a volume or an 
interest rate tender may depend on whether the central bank wishes to send a stronger signal (by setting a 
specific rate) or to receive information from the commercial banks based on their bids as to what they 
think the appropriate level of interest rates should be. If the central bank did not give t
xiii:
he market any
uidance via its OMO as to what it deemed the appropriate interest rate - for instance if it was following a 
dertaken in the repo market) on the basis of its forecast of reserve 
eeds and in the light of the deviation of the Fed funds market rate from its target.  The market is well 
While the minimum bid rate allowed in these tenders is equal to that of the ECB’s 
policy rate, the fact that the market does not infer a policy signal when accepted bid rates show a small
deviation from the policy rate reinforces the fact that operations are designed to implement only the pre-
announced policy rate. 
g
strong money quantity rule - it could still ensure an upper (lower) limit on rates by setting a rate for its 
standing lending (deposit) facilities, but would have to allow a lot of volatility in between. 
‘Signalling’ through varying the volume of OMOs used to be commonplace, and the market would 
scrutinise the central bank’s operations for indications of any change in policy stance.   However, this is 
now less common, as processes of setting tactical targets (e.g. interest rates) are more transparent, and the 
operations are simply designed to implement the rate that has already been announced to the market.  For 
example, in the U.S., the FOMC set a target level for the “Fed funds” rate:  the Fed decides how much
liquidity to supply in its OMOs (un
n
aware of this when making its interest rate bids. The “Fed funds” rate is normally maintained within a 
narrow band around the target rate. 
As already noted, the ECB adjusted its MROs from a fixed to a competitive rate tender in order to
eliminate overbidding.
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49 European Central Bank: “The implementation of monetary policy in the euro area: General documentation on Eurosystem
monetary policy instruments and procedures, February 2004”, available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/gendoc2004en.pdfxiv: The policy rate and shortage or surplus 
If the policy rate is determined on the basis of that deemed appropriate to achieve the targeted inflation 
rate, or support a targeted exchange rate, or perhaps to achieve a monetary aggregate target, it should 
make no difference whether there is a market shortage or surplus of liquidity. The policy rate should be 
unchanged. This is clear in relation to foreign exchange OMO, supporting a particular rate, where the 
central bank must operate at the target rate in order to maintain it whether the market is buying or 
selling foreign exchange. The same should hold true for interest rate tools. But in practice, some central 
banks will have a higher policy rate when lending to the market than when withdrawing funds. This is 
likely to confuse the policy signal (see discussion in section 3.v). 
In 2004, the Bank of England also announced that, in unusual circumstances e.g. if markets or 
settlement mechanisms for the collateral routinely used in the Bank’s OMOs and real time gross 
payment system were disrupted, or if banks were facing more direct problems themselves, it would be 
willing in principle to accept U.S. government securities as collateral in its routine operations.  The 
Bank would use the Fed as its custodian. 






INSTRUMENT 1. 7 day repo with the Bank
2.   Overnight fine-tune repo with 
the Bank on final day of 
maintenance period (to inject or 
drain, as appropriate) 
1.   Overnight repo
2.   Overnight 
deposit
No reserve requirements are 
in force, but banks may, by
agreement with the Bank, 
hold voluntary, contractual 
reserves.
The contracted level of 
reserves must be maintained,
on average, over the 
maintenance period 
(normally 4 weeks), within a 
range of +/- 1%.
SECURITY Any U.K. government security
(Gilts, Treasury Bills, non-
sterling marketable debt); and
BoE Euro Bills and Notes 
Sterling-denominated securities 
issued by EEA central 
governments, central banks  and 
major IFIs 
Euro-denominated securities 
issued by EEA central 
governments, central banks and 
major international institutions 
that are eligible in the European 
System of Central Banks’ 
monetary policy operations
1.  As for OMO 




1 and 2    MPC rate 
3             Market-determined rate 
MPC repo rate + 
100bp (- for deposit 
facility), reduced to 
+/- 25bp on the 
final day of the 
maintenance period 
Contractual balances are 
remunerated at the MPC rate. 
Any excess is 
unremunerated; any overdraft 
is charged at twice the MPC 
rate.
FREQUENCY 1   Once a week 
2   Final day of maintenance
period
3 Once a month
Any time during 




OMO counterparties Wide range of 
banks
Wide range of banks.
SETTLEMENT 1 and 2  Same
3            T+1 
 day Same day Not applicable 
457  STANDING FACILITIES 
Standing facilities are used at the initiative of the counterparty (unlike OMO in which the central bank 
takes the initiative) and provide or absorb liquidity when other techniques have not been fully exploited. 
Consequently, while usually available at any time, they are normally only used towards the end of the 
trading day and tend to carry a penal interest rate to discourage over-reliance.  They are sometimes
regarded as a safety-valve mechanism for liquidity management. A central bank will normally
expect/hope that the (net) day-to-day needs of the banking system will be met through either averaging of 
reserve requirements or through OMOs, where the central bank will normally operate only in one 
direction on a given day, and that standing facilities, over which it has much less control (at least in the 
short-term), and which can be used in both directions on the same day, should be used infrequently.  In 
some cases, there may be additional, non-price mechanisms for restricting use.  Access may be restricted 
to a percentage of the relevant bank’s capital, or limited to, say, a maximum number of days 
consecutively.  It may also be that normal access is determined by analysing the liquidity conditions 
prevailing in the market at the time and the spread between the rate charged on the facility and the market
rate.  Banks breaching these restrictions may be subject to additional supervisory requirements or, 
ultimately, to loss of authorisation (a bank which is over-reliant on central bank finance is, arguably, 
demonstrating an inability to fund itself in the market).  Over-reliance on central bank intermediation can 
hamper the development of active secondary financial markets.
Exceptionally, a central bank may need to restrict or close access to standing facilities. In some countries 
where there has been speculation about an exchange rate devaluation, banks have used standing facility 
borrowing to fund purchases of foreign exchange from the central bank (effectively using the SF to fund 
speculation against the central bank’s exchange rate target), betting that the speculative profits after the 
devaluation will more than offset the short-term interest rate costs of SF access.
xv: Broad categories of Standing Facilities 
When a bank has a temporary shortage of reserves (i.e. is in need of liquidity), the central bank has a 
number of options as to how it might provide liquidity to the market through SF.  It could:- 
x provide a collateralised overnight loan; 
x purchase outright short-dated securities, or foreign exchange; 
x offer an overnight repo transaction where the central bank buys securities (with original maturities of 
any length) from the bank with an agreement for their resale at a specified price the following day; 
46x undertake an overnight foreign exchange swap; the central bank purchases foreign exchange from the 
bank against domestic currency with an agreement for resale at a specified price (exchange rate) the 
following day. 
If a bank has a temporary excess of reserves, the central bank may:
x allow it to place overnight remunerated deposits with the central bank;
x sell foreign exchange outright; 
x undertake reverse repos, the central bank selling securities with an agreement to buy them back at a 
specified price the following day; 
x undertake an overnight foreign exchange swap; the central bank initially sells foreign currency and 
purchases domestic currency. 
These options are exactly the same as for OMO (section 6.x), with the exception that it is very rare for a 
central bank to sell securities outright in a standing facility. The outright purchase (discounting) of short-
term securities is more common, though less so than in the past. The differences lie in who takes the 
initiative and, reflecting this, in the pricing and the maturity.
xvi: Standing credit facilities 
Virtually all central banks make available a standing credit facility. This normally takes the form of
collateralised lending to the banking system at a margin above the central bank’s main intervention rate; 
borrowers cannot bid for the rate.  The penal rate of interest should act as an upper ceiling for market
interest rates (at least for secured credit) at this maturity.  These facilities – sometimes known as Lombard
facilities (for historical rather than technical reasons) - are designed typically to provide short-term
liquidity to banks on demand and are usually overnight.  Sometimes the facility acts as an overdraft
facility, by providing collateralised overnight funding to clear end-of-day imbalances – for instance if a 
commercial bank is unable to repay intraday credit provided for payment system purposes - and hence 
facilitate the smooth functioning of the payment system
50. The marginal lending facility at the ECB
51 and 
the primary and secondary credit programmes in the U.S. are examples of these
52.  Some credit facilities
are designed to provide longer-term collateralised funding on demand and at a pre-specified rate of 
interest.
50 The collateral needs to be either readily available or deposited in advance at the central bank, the latter option allowing the
central bank to appropriate it without the counterparty’s further approval.
51 The marginal lending and deposit facilities at the ECB are typically only used towards the end of the maintenance period;
at other times, counterparties typically take advantage of the reserve requirement averaging facility as well as the weekly 
MROs to manage their liquidity.
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52 These U.S. programmes were established in January 2003 and replaced the discount window, which had provided liquidity 
at a rate below the FOMC’s target for Federal funds (and latterly, despite the name, on a collateralised credit basis).If there is no standing credit facility, or if its cost is too high, or if access is uncertain, then banks will tend 
to hold more funds in their free reserves as it may be cheaper to forego interest than to pay the SF rate on 
occasion. At times banks may not make payments on behalf of customers on the due date, although this 
may just pass the problem on to another bank. 
xvii: Standing deposit facilities 
Central banks could use a deposit facility to put a floor to market rates at the given maturity, and hence 
limit undue softness in interest rates. Deposit SFs have traditionally been less widely used than lending 
facilities; but they are available at the ECB and Bank of England
53.  When the central bank wants to 
manage liquidity primarily via OMO and reserve averaging (a pro-active approach to operations), these 
will typically be well below market rates – eg 100 basis points lower in the euro area
54. To absorb market-
wide surplus liquidity, pro-active central banks tend to use open market bill sales - often at market rates - 
to prevent market interest rates falling by more than is desired for monetary policy purposes.  (Even in 
narrow corridor systems, the central bank may aim to set the rate far enough below the policy rate to give 
at least some room for an overnight interbank market to operate
55.) Some central banks will occasionally 
invite deposits from the banking system, but without offering a standing facility for them to do so. 
However, some central banks cannot forecast market liquidity with sufficient accuracy to operate a pro-
active operational stance.  In this case, in a situation of market-wide surplus liquidity, the deposit standing 
facility may effectively become the main policy instrument, and its rate could not by definition be below 
market rates (in Equation 1, section 2.b above, Pr.SFd will be high).
xviii: Symmetry or asymmetry in SFs? 
The asymmetry in many developed countries between lending facilities (ubiquitous) and deposit facilities 
(less common) reflects (i) the fact that in most developed markets the banking system is persistently short 
of reserves and (ii) a need for standing credit facilities to reduce the risk of end-of-day payment system
disruption (the payment system need for SFs is asymmetric).  In addition, most central banks are reluctant 
to operate in both directions (i.e. to borrow from and lend to the banking system) on the same day, fearing 
that it could inhibit the development of the commercial money market; instead they prefer to meet only 
the banks’ net requirements.  Standing facilities for deposits and loans can operate simultaneously (these 
may be symmetric about the intervention rate but need not be), without the central bank effectively 
becoming an interbank broker, only if the rates used on both are sufficiently penal - high for borrowing 
53 The Bank of England’s deposit facility was introduced in June 2001 in order to moderate any undue softness in overnight 
interest rates.  It also complemented the existing overnight lending facility, by putting the Bank of England’s overnight
operations at the end of each day on a symmetrical basis.
54 Some countries with an exchange rate target have used overnight deposit Standing Facilities at close to market rates, to 
support the exchange rate target.
48
55 In Australia and New Zealand, by market convention banks tend to trade overnight funds at the official policy rate.and low for deposits.  This is the case at the ECB and Bank of England, where there are overnight interest 
rate corridors of 200bps and 50bp, respectively, centred around the central banks’ respective intervention 
rates.
Particularly in a developing market, where counterparty creditworthiness may be difficult to assess, some
banks prefer a low-yielding deposit with the central bank to a market rate from a counterparty of uncertain 
creditworthiness. As such, in emerging market economies (as opposed to more developed economies),
standing facilities are likely, at least initially, to play a more prominent role than that of OMOs and inter-
market trading.  The depth of liquidity in the interbank market as well as how much progress has been 
made in liberalising market interest rates will also be key determining factors in how important standing 
facilities are for liquidity management. Hence, a central bank may find itself receiving large deposits from
some banks and at the same time needing to re-finance other banks, effectively intermediating between 
the two groups and taking the credit risk on itself. As with developed economies, to counter this and 
promote a more active secondary financial market, the rates used on both facilities should be sufficiently 
penal so as to discourage banks from seeing the facilities as an easy alternative to the interbank market.
xix: Maturity of SFs and collateral positioning 
Given the safety-valve nature of standing facilities, the maturity of the operation should be of a 
relatively short-term nature and the collateral should be easily accessible.  This can include short-term
loans (or deposits), repo (or reverse repo) or foreign exchange swaps, or the outright purchase (sale) by 
the central bank of short-term securities or of foreign exchange. In most countries, the maturity of SFs is 
overnight. This is suitable for the banking system: if rates are penal, banks will not want to lock into the 
penal rate for any longer than necessary.
The outright purchase (sale) of long-term securities would be less suitable as an SF mechanism.
If there is a restricted definition of suitable securities – e.g. type and maturity – this will increase the 
relative value of these securities to the banking system and so stimulate demand for them.
In some countries foreign exchange transactions may effectively operate as a standing facility.  If the 
central bank always stands ready to deal in foreign exchange with the market - and this is most obviously 
true where a currency board or fixed peg is in operation - the market can always adjust its holdings of 
domestic currency reserves by entering into foreign exchange transactions with the central bank.
Normally the central bank does not set a bid-offer spread to its exchange rate; but will often charge a 
small commission on banks using the facility.
49But in the case of a managed or free float, the central bank could use foreign exchange in OMO 
transactions eg via an auction. It might not be possible then to use outright foreign exchange transactions 
for SF, but it may be possible to use swaps. For instance, if the central bank were to view the foreign 
currency as collateral, it could enter into an overnight foreign exchange swap, and charge the commercial
bank a margin
56. This differs to the normal pricing used for foreign exchange swaps. 
The location of collateral is important for SFs, since the normal timing of the transactions – late in the 
business day – coupled with the need for same-day settlement means that there is little time to arrange the 
necessary back-office side of the transaction. If collateral is held in a registry managed by the central bank 
(this is often the case for treasury bills, or central bank bills if they are issued), or if the banks hold foreign
currency deposits with the central bank, then it should be easy to arrange for the transfer of collateral. If 
the securities settlement system is not managed by the central bank, then there will need to be systems – 
both technical and administrative – to allow for rapid access to the collateral. This is not always the case, 
effectively blocking some assets for use in SFs. If collateral is held abroad – whether securities or foreign
currency balances – there may be difficulties in ensuring sufficiently rapid access; and there may be 
timing problems eg if the collateral is held in a different time-zone.
50
56 An interest rate margin for SF of 100bp annual would equate to 0.28bp a day (100/360). An overnight transaction for 1 mn
currency units would cost the commercial bank 28 currency units.8 REQUIRED AND VOLUNTARY RESERVES
Reserve requirements are the percentage of commercial banks’
57 liabilities (or some sub-set thereof)
which they are required to hold as reserves at the central bank.  An increase in reserve requirements forces 
the banks to hold more balances at the central bank, other things being equal.  The banks have no 
discretion – except over time, by varying the structure of their balance sheets - and enforcement is usually 
through the central bank charging a penalty rate of interest for non-compliance, or more rarely, through 
non-price mechanisms such as limiting the transgressor’s access to central bank facilities. 
Historically, reserve requirements were regarded by some central banks as a prudential instrument - to 
ensure that banks had sufficient liquidity in case of withdrawal of deposits - rather than for monetary
policy purposes.  However, the importance of compulsory reserves as a prudential tool has lessened, at 





The desire to reduce the element of compulsion implicit in reserve requirements has generally led to 
reductions in their levels to the point at which they cannot provide a very significant buffer of 
liquidity;
With the development of financial markets, the range of other liquid assets available to commercial
banks has increased markedly, including assets which the central bank may itself be willing to accept 
as collateral;
The role of reserve requirements has widened, notably with the use of averaging, and therefore they 
are no longer optimally designed for prudential liquidity management, though of course they remain a 
liquid asset of the highest quality;
Operations such as central bank standing facilities have overtaken reserve requirements as the 
mechanisms most appropriate for tackling liquidity issues.  Indeed reserve requirements at high levels 
could even exacerbate bank liquidity problems by impounding banks’ reserves and limiting the 
development of financial markets.
In some cases, reserve requirements were intended to put a wedge between deposit and lending rates, so 
that an increase in reserve requirements would discourage lending. However, this may just discourage 
51
57 Sometimes, the constituency subject to reserve requirements is greater than just banks e.g. in the euro area it is all credit
institutions and in the U.K. it is banks and building societies.banking sector intermediation in the economy. In some countries, reserve requirements have been set at 
high levels simply to offset excess liquidity in the economy. This may appear to be a cheap way of 
mopping up excess liquidity, but is detrimental to long-term economic and financial sector development.
Over and above any monetary policy role, reserve requirements provide income for the central bank, if 
they are either unremunerated or remunerated at less than market interest rates.  The banks are compelled
to deposit with the central bank at sub-market interest rates and, in turn, the central bank can invest the 
proceeds at market rates
58.  Any surplus income is normally paid across to the Ministry of Finance as part 
of the central bank’s regular profits transfer, so to the extent there is surplus income, reserve requirements
are acting as a tax raising mechanism.  For many central banks (and Ministries of Finance), the income is 
an important reason why they prefer to maintain a system of unremunerated reserve requirements.
However the cost to the economy of a high level of unremunerated reserves may well exceed any short-
term income benefits for the authorities; they are clearly a wealth transfer rather than wealth creation 
mechanism, and high levels tend to inhibit financial sector development.
The Bank of England is planning to introduce reserve holdings on a voluntary basis as part of its planned 
money market reforms, to be introduced by mid-2006.  These proposed reforms were first outlined in a 
public consultation document, published on 7 May 2004 with the results of this consultation published on 
4 April 2005
59. The new framework will include a move to averaging with voluntary, contractual and 
remunerated reserves, and is designed to help stabilise the overnight interest rate. The reserves are 
voluntary since no bank is obliged to hold them; contractual, since the amount so held must be agreed in 
advance; and remunerated at the policy rate. The new system will also allow more banks access to the 
Bank of England’s operations, which should improve the banking system’s ability to cope with stressed 
conditions.
Key questions for required reserves relate to the absolute level of requirements; whether reserves are 
remunerated or not; whether they can be averaged over a period around some particular level; and in what 
circumstances, if at all, the level should be changed. If reserve balances with the central bank are 
remunerated at or close to the policy rate, banks may hold voluntary reserves, or may agree a particular 
level on a bilateral contractual basis with the central bank (as with the system to be introduced by the 
Bank of England from 2006). 
58 If reserve requirements are being used to mop excess liquidity, the benefit to the central bank is that of opportunity cost: it
should be cheaper – in the short-run – than market-based sterilisation instruments.
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59 Relevant documentation is available on the Bank of England’s website under the ‘Markets’ section.xx: Remuneration of reserves 
Central banks are increasingly moving towards remuneration of reserve requirements, normally at the 
policy (short-term OMO) rate. In some cases this requires a change in legislation, as some central bank 
laws prohibit the payment of interest to depositors
60. Where there is a market shortage of liquidity, the 
neutral cost of remuneration is the central bank’s policy rate (ie the cost of funding the reserves is offset 
by the remuneration, so there is no net cost). But where there is a market surplus of liquidity, it is less 
obvious what the ‘neutral’ rate would be. The marginal cost for banks’ liquidity might be zero (eg no 
interest paid on customers’ current accounts). But the opportunity cost of holding required reserves might
be the same as the central bank’s policy rate, provided the central bank aims to drain surplus liquidity at 
this rate. An alternative would be the standing deposit facility rate (if there is one). 
As noted above, if reserves are not, or not fully, remunerated they act as a tax on the banking system (and 
thus effectively on the customers of the banking system). Such taxes are distortionary. Remunerated
required reserves with no averaging provision are broadly similar to a deposit auction; but are less precise 
and less market-friendly. The amount of liquidity drained will vary as banks’ balance sheets change; and 
banks cannot trade required reserves (though in some countries they can pledge them as collateral).
Remunerated required reserves, where averaging is allowed, force banks to hold assets useful for liquidity 
management with only a small marginal cost to the banks. In this respect they are more useful than a 
deposit auction absorbing the same amount of liquidity at the same interest rate, since banks cannot use 
term deposits at the central bank to manage liquidity; and arguably more useful than issuance of central 
bank bills, since all banks have to hold required reserves whereas not all would buy auctioned bills. 
Moreover, while central bank bills (and other securities) can be used as collateral when accessing 
borrowing standing facilities, such facilities normally carry a penal rate of interest, whereas use of
averaging involves no additional cost to the banks. 
As noted above, if reserve balances are remunerated, the liquidity benefits of averaging will mean that 
banks will voluntarily hold reserve balances. Indeed, it may even be necessary to set a maximum level. 
xxi: Short to medium term liquidity management 
A change in reserve requirements - whether remunerated or not - is a relatively blunt instrument for 
managing liquidity in the banking system.  It is generally regarded as cumbersome to change them often – 
53
60 Such prohibitions can make it harder for central banks to manage surplus liquidity, since they cannot hold deposit
auctions.few countries change them as often as once a year - or quickly. The use of OMOs to manage bank 
liquidity is a more appropriate fine-tuning instrument and is more likely to stimulate market development.
However, required or contractual reserves applied on average over a period, say a month, rather than on 
each day, may help to reduce the short-term volatility of overnight interest rates.  Reserve averaging 
allows commercial banks to have automatic recourse to their cash balances with the central bank on a 
daily basis so long as the average level of reserves during the maintenance period at least equals the target 
level.  This means that the banks do not need to achieve any prescribed level of reserve holdings at the 
end of every day, and it thus helps to reduce daily volatility in short-term interest rates which may
otherwise be caused by, for instance, daily changes in the demand for cash by customers (the short-run 
demand curve for bank reserves becomes flatter). This stabilisation function can be achieved at any level
of required or contractual reserves, including zero, and does not depend on whether they are remunerated.
In some countries - such as the U.S. and the euro area - the banks are allowed to go down to (but not 
below) zero on individual days. In the past, Canada and Mexico gave even more flexibility, allowing 
averaging around zero, provided that any negative balance was fully collateralised by acceptable 
securities. A number of central banks permit averaging but with less flexibility, for example by allowing 
banks to go a certain percentage below the target figure but no more.  A country wishing to introduce 
averaging could adopt this last approach, gradually increasing the degree of freedom - say, 20% below the 
stipulated level on any day, and so on - and observing what effect this had on the banks’ management of 
their reserves and on monetary conditions in general before relaxing further. For instance, if the average 
required level is 5%, a minimum end of day level could be set at 4%.
A bank should be able to maintain its actual average reserves very close to the target figure under an 
averaging system provided that (i) it has adequate systems to enable it to monitor and manage its 
liquidity; (ii) the scope for flexibility given by averaging exceeds the bank’s need for operational reserves, 
and (iii) it has access to the interbank market or central bank facilities to offset any shortfall or excess. 
The last point implies that the central bank has a responsibility to provide the banking system with the 
appropriate level of liquidity over the maintenance period as a whole.  If done, the introduction of an 
averaging system will therefore normally reduce the banking system’s need for “free” (precautionary) 
reserves to close to zero, on average, effectively representing an injection of liquidity into the economy.
Central banks must take account of this if introducing reserve averaging.  If monetary conditions are to 
remain unchanged, their introduction should be accompanied by measures to withdraw liquidity, such as 
an increase in the level of reserve requirements, or open-market operations. 
If the flexibility provided to the banking system by reserve averaging is sufficient to cover day-to-day 
54fluctuations in reserves, within-maintenance period interest rate volatility due to short-term or seasonal 
causes should be virtually eliminated.  If the flexibility is not sufficient - perhaps because reserve 
requirements themselves are low, because only limited averaging is allowed or because averaging is not 
available to all banks - then averaging should help to reduce within-period seasonal volatility of interest 
rates but will not eliminate it.  However, evidence suggests that overnight interest rates are likely to be 
more volatile on the last day of the reserve maintenance period.  To mitigate this increased end-period 
interest rate volatility, some central banks allow a small proportion of the reserve requirement to be 
carried forward and met in the next maintenance period, while others use fine tuning operations. 
It could be argued that reserve averaging can lead to poorer liquidity management as commercial banks 
take advantage of the increased flexibility averaging brings, and this may raise prudential issues.  It could 
also be feared that, with commercial banks not needing to meet a binding reserve requirement on a daily 
basis, this may reduce market activity; and that a reduced need for trading will mean that banks will not 
need to test their creditworthiness in the market to such an extent, and this could also lead to prudential 
issues. On the other hand, banks could use the opportunity to take a more strategic approach to liquidity 
management, and so improve it. Indeed, a fear of having to resort to SF may discourage some banks from
participating in the interbank market on a market-making basis; averaging, by easing the short-term
liquidity constraint, may encourage participation. In practice, averaging is normally of benefit to the 
market.
xxii: The maintenance period
The central bank will have to decide on the most appropriate maintenance period e.g. it is two-weeks for 
the U.S. and one-month for the euro area.   The length of the period will be a function of how active / 
passive a role the central bank wishes to have in terms of frequency of intervention in the market. The 
central bank should intervene at least once per maintenance period, for liquidity management purposes; at 
least once a week is normal.  A few central banks operate, or have operated, a maintenance period of one 
week. But this is probably too short for banks to gain much benefit from averaging. Two weeks, or 4-5 
weeks, is more common. It is also important to try and avoid days of increased liquidity uncertainty (e.g. 
tax payment dates) when determining the end-dates of the maintenance period.
For monetary policy purposes, there is a benefit to aligning the maintenance period ends with dates when 
monetary policy decisions are taken eg the MPC decision day in the UK, or the relevant Governing 
Council meeting in the ESCB. Provided operations at the policy rate do not span the end of the 
maintenance period, this can eliminate market speculation about future changes in interest rates leading to 
short-term rate volatility: averaging cannot then be used to arbitrage between official rates before and 
55after the policy meeting.
xxiii: Monetary policy purposes 
Changes in the level of reserve requirements, irrespective of whether they are remunerated or not, can be 
used to affect the amount of banks’ free reserves and short-term interest rates.  For example, suppose a 
rise in the supply of reserve money is induced by higher unfunded government expenditure or lower tax 
receipts, or by central bank intervention to purchase foreign exchange.  This will result in an increase in 
banks’ free reserves at the central bank and a decline in short-term money market interest rates.  Interbank 
interest rates and the banks’ free reserves could be returned to their initial levels by the central bank 
increasing reserve requirements and thus the banks’ demand for required reserves. (Similarly, reserve 
requirements could be reduced again once government expenditure declined or tax receipts increased, or 
foreign currency was sold by the central bank.) But reserve requirements are increasingly seen as a weak 
and rather blunt tool. 
Reserve requirements remunerated at below market interest rates are a tax on financial intermediation. If 
the tax is sufficiently large, it is likely to result in disintermediation from the domestic banking system.
Banks will try to hold more of their deposit liabilities in instruments not subject to reserve requirements.
Therefore, even if higher reserve requirements - remunerated at below market interest rates - increase the 
effectiveness of controlling the official measure of the money supply, disintermediation is likely to mean
that this measure is less relevant.  This would imply a weakening in the relationship between the targeted 
measure of the money supply, on the one hand, and prices and real output on the other.
Moreover, banks would be expected to increase the spread between deposit and lending rates offered to 
customers if reserves are not fully remunerated: the central bank would be passing the cost of the liquidity 
withdrawal onto the banks’ customers, with consequent changes in their behaviour.
Therefore the active use of reserve requirement levels as a monetary policy instrument in most developed 
countries has disappeared and they now tend to be kept at low and stable levels.  However requirements
tend not to be eliminated altogether due to the resulting impact on the market’s liquidity position.  In 
addition central banks are keen to retain the smoothing influence on short term interest rates that reserve 
averaging brings, with many providing remuneration to minimise (though not necessarily eliminate
61) the 
tax impact of imposing requirements - e.g. the ECB remunerates reserves at the average of the marginal
interest rates of the Main Refinancing Operations (MROs) over the maintenance period.  But for monetary
policy purposes, central banks prefer to use more market-orientated mechanisms such as OMO and SF.
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61 Banks have to hold assets to meet the reserve requirement and these tend to be lower yielding than the banks would prefer. xxiv: General issues about reserve requirements 
a number of issues that the central bank needs to consider 
hen deciding on the definition of this base.
x
e base should consider the range of liabilities which can be the source of involuntary 
cash outflows. 
x
Reserve requirements are typically based on a proportion of an institution's deposit liabilities known as 
the “reserve requirement base”. There are
w
What is the objective of the reserve requirement?  For example, if it is to ensure the effective control 
over broad money for monetary policy purposes, then the definition of the deposit base should be as 
similar as possible to the desired target measure of the broad money supply (assuming a money supply 
target is used).  If the deposit base is defined more narrowly / widely than the target, then control 
could be impaired as they may operate independently.  If reserve requirements are designed for 
alternative reasons such as to raise income or to provide a liquidity buffer, then the deposit base may
differ from that which would be included for achieving a monetary target e.g. for a liquidity buffer 
requirement, th
Reserve requirements should not be applied to interbank deposits, since this would act as a double tax 
on banks - they would be taxed on raising deposits from non-banks and then again when monies were 
re-deposited at other banks - and would inhibit the development of an inter-bank market.
x Reserve requirements should be applied equally, as far as possible, to all banks and all types of 
deposit
62, for reasons of equity, ease of calculation and monitoring and because a multi-tier reserve 
requirement would weaken the central bank’s monetary control - for example, a shift in deposits 
between banks or between types of deposit which were subject to different reserve requirements might
alter the aggregate reserve ratio and thus overall monetary conditions, independently of  any action 
intended by the central bank.  Indeed having a multi-tier reserve requirement would actively encourage 
banks to adjust their liability portfolios into products of lower / zero reserve weights. 
x Reserve requirements should be applied equally to domestic and foreign currency liabilities, although 
there is some debate on whether reserve requirements imposed on foreign currency liabilities should be 
met in domestic or foreign currency (the former imposing a foreign exchange mismatch on the banks’ 
books).
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62 This may, however, be difficult in the early stage of reform if excess reserves are unevenly distributed across the financial
system. In practice, and for prudential reasons, reserve requirements in many countries are levied at a higher rate on sight
than on time deposits.x There should be a lag between the calculation period and the holding period for the reserves, otherwise 
the reserve requirement will be a function of the banks’ liabilities during the maintenance period, 
which will be uncertain until the end of the period. 
When considering what assets should be eligible to be counted towards reserve requirements, deposits 
with the central bank are always included.  More debatable is the treatment of vault cash i.e. that which is 
in the vaults of the commercial bank.  Some central banks include vault cash as part of the eligible assets 
that count towards reserve requirements because of the transport costs and security issues of excluding it. 
Others exclude it on the basis that it can lead to a rising proportion of damaged / soiled banknotes in 
circulation as the central bank’s ability to inspect notes is lessened, or because inclusion can encourage 
inefficient cash management by banks.  How frequently data on cash holdings is reported will have an 
impact: if there is a substantial lag, it may be difficult for the central bank to know accurately the actual 
level of reserve holdings until some time after the end of the maintenance period, and difficult therefore to 
manage liquidity accurately. One possibility would be to count vault cash towards reserves, but with a lag 
of, say, one month. Then the central bank would know at the start of the reserve maintenance period 
exactly how much vault cash was to be included for that period. 
For remuneration purposes, there is a case for remunerating only balances at the central bank, but not 
vault cash, in part to encourage efficient cash handling. But some central banks would remunerate both, as 
both constitute a central bank liability. Exclusion could penalise regional banks, or those with a branch 
network in rural areas, as it may be harder/more expensive for them to return surplus cash to the central 
bank.
Also, assets eligible to be counted towards meeting reserve requirements should not include government
securities or any other OMO eligible instruments. Otherwise OMOs would be less effective to the extent 
that banks could purchase such securities, when sold by the central bank, with their cash held for 
meeting the reserve requirement (as the securities would act as the substitute in meeting the 
requirement), thereby leaving their free reserves unaffected and hence negating the impact of the OMO. 
The inclusion of these securities towards meeting reserve requirements would also hinder the 
development of a liquid secondary market in them.
589  COUNTERPARTIES 
When the central bank starts to use market-based instruments, and particularly OMOs, it needs to consider 
whether it should deal with all banks, or with just a small range of counterparties.  To some extent this is 
an administrative issue.  If central bank OMOs are infrequent, perhaps once a week, and the banking 
system has some scope for day-to-day (fine-tuning) liquidity management via reserve averaging or 
standing facilities, then the OMOs could easily involve all banks, and possibly even non-bank financial 
companies such as securities firms
63.  The operation may take longer, because of the need to process bids 
from a potentially large number of counterparties, than if the central bank dealt only with a restricted 
group.  But for infrequent operations this may not be important.  On the other hand, if the central bank 
conducts OMOs every day, or several times a day, it may well prove too cumbersome a process to deal 
with all registered banks. A desire to improve the speed and accuracy of the bidding process may justify a 
move away from a telephone based dealing system to a potentially more costly electronic system.  Central 
banks who do adopt an electronic dealing system will however need to take care to continue cultivating a 
dialogue with their counterparties.  This dialogue provides an opportunity for the central bank’s dealers to 
discuss market conditions and gain market intelligence.  It can allow the central bank to evaluate how 
efficient its monetary operations are, how effectively it is communicating its monetary policy and, what 
the market’s expectations are for the future.  It can also draw the central bank’s attention to certain areas 
of risk in the financial system that may have otherwise gone unnoticed for a longer period of time.
Many countries choose to conduct OMOs with a smaller group of intermediaries such as the primary
dealers in the U.S.  However, the ECB chose to conduct its MROs (as well as that of its longer-term
operations and access to standing facilities) with all credit institutions in the ‘Euro’ area (i.e. all those 
subject to Reserve Requirements), subject to certain minimum conditions (e.g. counterparties must be 
financially sound and fulfil operational criteria to ensure the efficient conduct of the monetary operation). 
This is potentially several thousand institutions; in practise, a few hundred.  The operations are 
decentralised; each credit institution deals with its national central bank, having signed a legal agreement
before so doing.  All decisions on tenders (amount, allocation etc) are taken by the ECB.  Bids are 
submitted on the day of the tender, with the results published the same day and settlement made the 
following day.  However for some operations (e.g. quick tenders, used at the end of maintenance periods 
if market rates move too far from the MRO rate) each national central bank selects a sub-group of 
counterparties from those that fulfil the general eligibility criteria.  This selection centres on the 
counterparty’s activity in the money market, efficiency of the trading desk and bidding potential.  When
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63 Most of the Fed’s primary dealer counterparties are the securities firm subsidiaries of banking groups. foreign exchange swaps are used in monetary operations, the range of eligible counterparties corresponds 
to those selected for the Eurosystem’s foreign exchange intervention operations.
If there is to be a smaller number of counterparties, the selection will partly depend on what function they 
are expected to perform.  If they are expected to distribute liquidity throughout the system, they will need 
to have the systems and interbank relationships to do so.  Or they could be asked to take on other 
obligations in return for the dealing relationship with the central bank - such as making a market in short-
term funds.   If banks are allowed to be OMO counterparties simply in order to help them manage their 
own liquidity, the selection may be simpler.  The central bank could simply choose a group of the largest 
banks in the country (defined by paid-up capital, or balance sheet size either at a particular date or 
averaged over a period), perhaps revising the list once a year.  At the margin this might encourage some
banks to boost their balance sheet in order to be included in this group; some flexibility in the number
chosen – i.e. “around 50 of the largest banks” - might help to avoid this, though it could also give rise to 
charges of favouritism.  Another possibility would be to use a group of specialist market-making
intermediaries, which did not engage in general banking business.  Perhaps, the choice of counterparties 
should just encompass those banks that settle their accounts over the books of the central bank.
In deciding the particular function for the counterparties to perform, the central bank should remember
that counterparties are typically profit-maximising private sector firms.  For a counterparty to want to 
enter into a dealing relationship with the central bank (and remain with that status), any obligations from
dealing will need to be balanced by some equivalent benefits.  Typically counterparties will have to deal 
with the central bank on a regular basis, and this may involve dealing at a time which does not suit their 
trading book e.g. the central bank providing liquidity to a net short market, but with the counterparty long 
of funds.  As much as possible, the central bank should keep the definition of “regular” fairly relaxed e.g. 
in terms of size and frequency.  The analysis of the counterparty’s performance
64 could be over a period 
of weeks rather than on a daily basis so as to allow for flexibility (e.g. to take account of fluctuations in 
the counterparty’s staffing arrangements). Other obligations may involve central banks’ charging more
than private market players for allowing access to central bank liquidity.  The charge may be in the form
of an initial margin (haircut).
Set against these obligations, the counterparty must weigh up the benefits of having access to central bank 
liquidity (and where deposit facilities are available, an outlet for excess funds), having the ability to open 
60
64  Performance measurements could include frequency and size of dealing with the central bank (absolute and in relation to
their primary or secondary market share of the instruments traded), analysis of liquidity distribution (e.g. via the analysis of
the spread between the policy rate and market rates) and through qualitative assessment of market intelligence. a dialogue with the central bank about the conduct of the financial markets
65.  Indeed the central bank 
should also be comfortable with the credit risk exposure of dealing with its chosen counterparties.  This 
may involve the central bank imposing a minimum acceptable credit rating in the selection criteria
66.
Others though prefer a less formal approach, suggesting that the counterparties must only be subject to 
appropriate prudential supervision and drawing comfort from criteria that push selection towards those 
that have an active presence in the relevant markets.  The choice of repo as the cornerstone of many
central banks’ transactions with their counterparties is also partly driven by the credit risk protection that 
this instrument affords the cash lender. 
Whatever criteria are used in the choice of counterparties, it is important that any such group of 
intermediaries is large enough for competition to exist between them. In some cases, it may be that the 
central bank may have to impose certain dealing restrictions (e.g. maximum allocation limits based on the 
stock of refinancing outstanding) in order to ensure a level playing field and sufficient competition
67.
The central bank can also distinguish between different groups for different functions. For instance, the 
Bank of England’s new system distinguishes between OMO counterparties and Settlement Banks (those 
playing a major role in the payment system). OMO counterparties do not need to be banks and do not 
need access to Standing Facilities. Those banks playing a role in the payment system will need access to 
Standing Facilities, but do not need to be OMO counterparties. (In practice, of course, there will be a large 
degree of overlap.) The table below, from the Bank of England’s April 2005 publication “Reform of the 
Bank of England’s Operations in the Sterling Money Markets” indicates the relationship between the 
functions and the counterparty groups. ‘Reserve-scheme member’ refers to any bank which chooses to 
hold voluntary, contractual reserves with the Bank of England. Settlement banks must be reserve scheme
members, but reserve scheme members are not required to become settlement banks. 
MKTS_
65 The Bank of England does not publish a list of its counterparties. The US Fed does publish, but notes that " this list has 
been compiled and made available for statistical purposes only and has no significance with respect to other relationships
between dealers and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.” 
66 Due to the importance of conducting effective monetary operations in order to achieve the desired monetary policy, the
legal agreement used, while perhaps based on a standard market agreement, may be tailored so that it is set up in favour of 
the central bank. 
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67  A related topic is covered in more detail in Handbook No.6, “Primary dealers in government securities markets”.Access to Bank Facilities 
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6210 STRUCTURES OF MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Most central banks in developed countries use a combination of OMOs, standing facilities and reserve 
requirements for managing liquidity and achieving their monetary policy objectives.  The appropriate 
balance between them will depend on the structure of local financial markets, and the way in which the 
central bank wishes to manage the market.  As the market develops, and in particular as a central bank’s 
ability to forecast liquidity flows strengthens, OMOs are likely to play a more prominent role than 
standing facilities.
Amongst major developed country central banks, some target the overnight interbank rate (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, US); this may be referred to variously as the ‘(Official) Cash Rate’ or ‘Federal 
Funds Rate’. The UK, following the Sterling Money Market Reforms, will seek to ensure that the 
overnight rates
68 out to the next MPC meeting date are consistent with the MPC official rate. The ECB 
does not specify a target, but aims for the overnight rate out to at least two weeks to be in line with its 
Main Refinancing Minimum Bid Rate. 
Many central banks deal directly only with a small group, maybe 20, of specialist money market
counterparties (which do not need to be banks). The ECB deals potentially with all credit institutions in 
the euro area, but in practice with 200-300. In developing countries it is common to allow all banks to 
participate; and it does not always make sense to introduce a market-maker function, especially if rates 
are too volatile, or money markets too underdeveloped, for such a role to be undertaken without 
substantial risk. 
A number of developed country central banks (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA) conduct OMO on 
a daily basis, though the ECB operates only weekly, and the Bank of England will also operate weekly 
following the introduction of the new system in 2006. Countries which do not have required reserves, or 
do not allow for reserve averaging, have to operate on a daily basis in order to manage market liquidity 
(though reserve averaging does not preclude daily operations, as in the US). Many developing market
central banks conduct OMO only once a week, leaving liquidity management between operations to 
reserve averaging and SFs. 
The use of repo is predominant, with central banks attracted by its flexibility and legal protection.  Repo 
can be used either to provide or absorb liquidity and can be accommodated within a variety of auction 
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68 Notably the uncollateralized interbank rate and the interbank repo rate; and SONIA (the weighted average of actual
overnight transactions conducted via the brokers). systems (e.g. fixed or variable rate); it is self-liquidating, making it ideal for operations designed to 
temporarily adjust the market’s liquidity position; and the fact that the transaction unwinds means it does 
not impact on the price of the underlying security. The same flexibility can be achieved with collateralised 
lending (to supply liquidity) and the sale of short-term central bank bills (to drain liquidity). But repo 
typically offers stronger legal protection than collateralised lending: if properly documented, it affords the 
lender of cash legal ownership of the underlying security for the duration of the trade.  This means that if 
a counterparty were to default, the central bank (as lender) could sell those securities in the secondary 
market in order to try and recoup its lost money.  In general, the G7 countries make little regular use of 
outright transactions.
In many if not most developing markets, the central bank faces a surplus of liquidity, and needs to operate 
to drain liquidity rather than lending to the banks. In a number of countries, the central bank takes 
remunerated deposits, or sells short-term securities, at a range of different maturities; repo is not 
commonly used to drain liquidity (not least since many central banks lack a portfolio of suitable 
securities). If more than one maturity is used, it is advisable to have a clear idea of the reason for the use 
of different maturities: too many, especially if the central bank determines the rate, may confuse the signal 
which the central bank sends to the market. Where foreign exchange is used as an OMO tool, this nearly 
always takes the form of outright transactions. Foreign exchange swaps could be used if the central bank 
was concerned only about liquidity management; but as exchange rate management is normally also 
important, outrights make sense. 
Particularly in developed markets, central banks undertake liquidity forecasts to allow them to use OMO 
and reserve averaging as the prime tools of liquidity management. It is then normal for standing facilities
to be subject to penal interest rates (being set at a margin above/below the policy rate) in order to 
encourage use of OMO and the interbank market. The U.S. moved to this model of penalty interest rates 
in 2003.  The spread between SF rates and the policy rate will reflect a range of issues: the depth and 
liquidity of the market (25bp might be sufficient incentive in one market, but be negligible in another); 
whether or not there is an exchange rate target; how tightly the central bank wishes to steer market rates; 
the quality of the liquidity forecast and perhaps whether the central bank is usually draining or supplying 
liquidity.
In the euro area, Reserve Requirements are remunerated at the average of the marginal interest rates in the 
MROs over the maintenance period, so that the implicit taxation is minimised. The reasons for the 
imposition of reserve requirements at the ECB are to allow averaging and to increase the size of the 
structural shortage of liquidity in the market. In the US, reserve requirements are averaged but not 
remunerated; in Australia there is no reserve requirement as such, but banks hold voluntary reserve 
64balances which are remunerated at 25bp below the policy rate, and which operate in some respects as 
remunerated reserves with averaging. The UK will introduce remunerated contractual reserves from 2006. 
6511   CONCLUSIONS 
There is no single ideal structure of either monetary policy targets or money market operations.  These 
structures will vary from country to country, depending on size, structure of financial markets, history 
and so on; and for any one country the optimal targets and structure may change over time. That said, 
certain issues are common to most countries; and the fact that in some cases the same, or similar,
solutions are adopted by a clear majority may indicate that those solutions are in some way better than 
the other possibilities
69.
Some central banks use interest rates as their operational lever. In some cases this is complemented by 
an intermediate target, which may be for the exchange rate or some other variable, such as the quantity 
of money. The final policy target is typically for inflation. Others use the exchange rate as an 
operational lever, whether with a fixed target or a managed float. The choice may reflect the level of 
market development, and of effectiveness: in many developing markets, the interest-rate lever is weak. 
Interest-rate levers may be used in support of an exchange rate intermediate target. Foreign exchange 
operations could be used as part of the central bank’s liquidity management, in order to reduce volatility 
in short-term interest rates. 
A distinction may be drawn between shorter-term and longer-term goals.  On a day-to-day basis central 
banks usually aim to keep market interest rates or the exchange rate relatively steady, close to a target 
level.  But the target level of interest rates is changed periodically, consistent with the broader monetary
policy targets for the exchange rate, monetary growth or inflation; and exchange rate targets are also 
subject to revision. 
Liquidity management is a key part of monetary operations. Even if the central bank has no interest rate 
policy, it makes sense to have a structure of operations which will allow for efficient management of
liquidity, and so prevent short-term interest rate volatility occurring purely as a result of short-term
liquidity flows which carry no economic information. Reserve averaging is a key tool here, ideally 
complemented by a good liquidity forecast. In the absence of a good liquidity forecast, SFs have to take 
on a more significant liquidity management role. 
In some countries, the banking sector is normally short of liquidity. This then forces the banking system
to borrow from the central bank, so that the central bank can enforce its desired level of interest rates. 
The central bank is liquidity provider of last resort, and can use its monopoly strongly.  But in the 
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69 Although it may instead indicate that, to some extent, even monetary policy makers like to go with the crowd. majority of countries, the banking sector has surplus liquidity. It can place the excess with the central 
bank and the central bank then determines the interest rate at which it withdraws liquidity from the 
commercial banks.  But this is not seen to ‘bite’ so much on the banks. If the banking system is short, it 
has no choice but to participate in OMOs or SFs to borrow; but if it is long, it could in principle choose 
not to participate in offsetting OMOs, particularly term interest-rate based OMOs, or in SFs with a 
maturity longer than overnight.  For instance, there have been occasions of banks holding the excess 
liquidity on a settlement account at the central bank rather than engaging in OMOs, preferring to 
maintain liquidity and thus the option to switch funds into foreign exchange at short notice
70.
Those operations where the central bank can easily determine the maturity, and which have minimal
spill over effect beyond the short-term money markets, are normally preferable.  These would include 
repo, collateralised lending and foreign exchange swaps.  There are different risks - financial and legal - 
involved in each; but because they are all reversed (within a period which may be much shorter than the 
remaining life of the underlying asset), they do not have the same effect on the securities or foreign 
exchange markets as outright transactions.  They are preferable, therefore, for monetary policy 
operations, whereas outright transactions in government securities or foreign exchange are more useful 
when the central bank or government want to alter their debt management or exchange rate policies. 
There is a great merit to simplicity. Those using an exchange rate lever operate periodically – whether 
daily or weekly – in the outright foreign exchange market. This is straightforward, though the impact
may be weakened if the central bank operates in bilateral outright foreign exchange operations at times
other than in its regular OMO. Many central banks using interest-rate levers operate with a policy rate, 
normally though not always for a short-term maturity (up to two weeks); and overnight standing 
facilities at a margin above and below the policy rate. While a number of central banks set different 
interest rates for different maturity operations, this often confuses the policy signal and can discourage 
money market development.
Market-based instruments may appear to be more risky, or less certain, than administrative measures
such as direct controls on credit extension because their impact on the banking system, and on the wider 
economy, cannot be precisely determined in advance, especially if there is no track-record of their use. 
But it is important to distinguish between direct controls whose effect on statistics may be clear but 
whose effect on the real economy is less clear and likely to weaken over time, and which obstruct 
market evolution; and indirect instruments, which cannot be administratively evaded and whose effect 
encourages both efficient behaviour by the banking system and development of financial markets.
70 Further details can be found in the CCBS Lecture Series #3: “Surplus Liquidity: Implications for Central Banks” (Joe 
Ganley) which can be found at www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/handbooks_lectures.htm
67Central banks in developed markets find that market-based instruments are, in most circumstances, more
flexible and more efficient for the wider economy.
*              *             *             *
68APPENDIX 1: RESERVE MONEY TARGETING 
If the central bank were to fix the month by month path of reserve money (M0) and take the view that 
this will have a predictable influence on the broad money supply (BM)
71, this would require that the 
ratio of broad money to reserve money - the money multiplier (m) - is stable, or at least predictable. 
Broad money is defined by BM = C+D, where C is domestic currency in circulation and D is deposits 
with commercial banks; reserve money is defined by M0 = C+R, where R is central bank liabilities held 


























If the ratio of the banks’ reserves at the central bank to their own deposit liabilities (R/D) and the ratio 
of currency issued to their deposits (C/D) are constant, then any increase in the supply of reserve money
will be reflected in a fixed multiple expansion of broad money (BM) as banks expand their balance 
sheets to use the additional headroom, and the money multiplier will be constant in the medium term.
In practice, these ratios, as well as the ratio of nominal income to broad money (the velocity of money),
are often not very stable or even predictable, particularly during periods of financial liberalisation or 
rapid changes in inflation. This means that a specific quantity of reserve money could be consistent with 
a range of outcomes for the broad money supply, inflation and real output.  Most central banks use a 
monetary aggregate as a monitoring variable rather than as a target. That said, it may well be that, where 
monetary financing or capital inflows are major factors driving narrow money growth (ie it is supply- 
rather than demand-driven), the relationship between narrow money growth and inflation may be 
stronger and hence sterilising action by the central bank more appropriate. 
In the chart below, if the central bank wants to stabilise interest rates at r  (its policy rate), then it will 
inject or absorb liquidity as necessary to do this: this is a liquidity management function. The supply 
curve will be horizontal, and a move from M0
D to M0
D-1 or M0
D-2 does not affect rates. By contrast, if it 
wishes to hold the path of reserve money growth on a given course – imperfectly represented by the 
vertical line supply curve in the chart – then it will have to accept the change in interest rates to which this 
will lead, for a given change in demand. For example, a demand shift from M0
D to M0
D-1 will lead to 
interest rates rising, over time, to r . If there is a shift in supply – e.g. if the supply curve shifts to the right 





71 If the velocity of broad money is predictable, changes in the quantity of broad money will, in turn, affect prices and real 
output in a predictable manner.reserves, then in both cases – stabilising interest rates or the path of reserve money – the central bank will 
need to take offsetting action to move the supply curve back. 
M0s – rate target








Longer-run demand curve is interest-rate elastic: central





70APPENDIX 2:  SECURITIES USED IN MARKET-BASED OPERATIONS 
If securities other than those of the domestic government are accepted as collateral, or bought outright 
or on repo, the central bank needs to be able to satisfy itself about the credit risk involved.  This will 
involve restrictions on acceptability, such as a minimum credit rating of the issuer, and in the case of 
some issuers a maximum for original maturity and perhaps a lower maximum for residual maturity.
There may also be a maximum exposure limit to some issuers. 
A certificate of deposit (CD) issued by a bank would not provide any additional security in lending to 
that bank, though a CD issued by bank A might perhaps be used as collateral in lending to bank B. 
Similarly, a commercial bill issued by a company and drawn on (and guaranteed by) a bank with which 
it had very close links might represent poor collateral when lending to that bank.  But a commercial bill 
drawn on bank A and endorsed (guaranteed) by bank B might be used as collateral in lending to bank B. 
In other words, the central bank needs to ensure that collateral provided does actually reduce its 
exposure to credit risk to within acceptable limits.
Where securities are accepted as collateral or used in repo transactions, the central bank should consider 
taking (but not giving) margin.  For instance, if a bank wishes to borrow 100, it might be required to 
provide securities with a current market value of 105 (the additional 5 represents the ‘initial margin’ or 
‘haircut’).  In developed markets the borrower is normally required to maintain the margin on a daily 
basis, subject to a materiality threshold known as the ‘call trigger’ amount.  If the secondary market value 
of the securities in question falls, more must be provided; and if it rises, some may be withdrawn (the 
amount that moves is known as ‘variation margin’).  If margin is maintained daily, then the lender is 
exposed to risk of loss only if the market price of the securities falls by more than 5% (or however large 
the initial margin is) during the day. 
If some securities involve the central bank in more work or expense, it is reasonable for the central bank 
to charge these costs to the borrower. 
The location of settlement may also be important, if securities which are settled in other countries are 
accepted. In this case, the central bank will need to consider different jurisdictional issues, ease and cost 
of access, and business hours. 
71APPENDIX 3:  SIZE OF OPERATIONS 
Under a fixed rate tender
72, if the central bank injects or withdraws liquidity for a week, or a month, then 
at the same time it sets or at least influences the marginal interest rate for that period.  The discussion on 
setting official rates suggested that central banks have the most influence through their market operations 
on short-term rates, and this implies that the maturity of the central bank’s operations should also be 
short-term
73.  If the weighted average maturity of the central bank’s stock of lending to the banking sector 
is, say, two weeks (10 working days), then this stock will be ten times the size of its average daily 
operations, or twice the size of its average weekly operations.  Does the size of the stock and/or flows 
matter? And will the banking system be affected by its net or its gross position vis-à-vis the central bank? 
In terms of direction, whilst most central banks would prefer to operate with the market in a structural 
deficit (i.e. lending to the market), many operate in an environment of surplus liquidity in the market and 
yet still have influence over market rates (although there are balance sheet cost implications).
Some argue that the size of the stock and flows does not matter: it is sufficient that the central bank is the 
marginal provider of liquidity to the banking sector for it to be able to control interest rates at the maturity
at which it intervenes.  That argument assumes, however, that markets work perfectly and that economic
agents respond predictably and immediately to the smallest shifts in their marginal costs or revenues. It 
may also assume that there is only one marginal provider of liquidity. It is more likely in practice that the 
size of the stock does matter.  In a market system, the central bank’s OMO rate has an influence only if 
the banking sector needs, or expects that it may need, to borrow (or perhaps deposit surplus cash) at that 
rate.  Furthermore, only if banks have (or anticipate the need) to conduct substantial volumes of 
transactions (in relation to the size of their balance sheets) at the central bank’s rate, will changes in that 
rate be likely to have a very close short-term influence on the banks’ own interest rate structures. 
However, the precise relationship between the size of the central bank’s activities in this area and the 
influence over market rates is a matter of debate. 
For a given stock of central bank lending to the banking sector, the longer the average maturity of the 
central bank’s operations, the smaller will be their average daily scale.  The central bank may have 
preferences over the size of these daily operations: does it want an active or more passive role in daily 
market activity?
72 Or indeed even if it is a variable rate tender regime with the central bank enforcing a minimum bid rate (e.g. ECB MROs). 
73 The maturity of the central bank’s operations will also be a function of the desired liquidity profile in the banking system.  A 
central bank concerned about a structural surplus in its money market could issue debt in its own name (central bank bills) for a 
maturity substantially longer than the maturity at which it conducts OMOs so as to reduce or eliminate the surplus. However,
in this case the central bank would need to understand the effect on its balance sheet; and the central bank would normally be a
rate taker in longer-maturity operations.
72The size of daily flows may also need to be considered for payment and settlement capacity 
considerations. Some central banks effectively split their liquidity management operations, using short-
term operations to implement policy, but putting part of their transactions with the commercial banks onto 
a longer-maturity basis at a market rate. One reason for this is to prevent potential problems in back-office 
management of very large volume transactions from interfering with the monetary policy signal. 
The frequency of the monetary policy meetings should also be considered when deciding on the maturity
of the operations: there is the potential for current policy operations to become entangled with 
expectations over future policy. For this reason, central banks with a pre-announced calendar of monetary
policy decision meetings may ensure that OMOs do not straddle the dates on which a decision is made
e.g. the ECB and, after the current reforms, the U.K. An alternative approach is to operate very short-
term, such that the weighted average of any OMO lending which straddles a decision date is very small in 
relation to the total of OMO lending. 
73APPENDIX 4:  DECENTRALISATION 
In most countries there is just one financial centre, and banks or financial companies which wish to be 
involved in the heart of the banking system will have an office, if not their head office, in that centre. 
Frequently the banks and other financial institutions are closely grouped around the central bank and the 
exchanges, as, prior to widespread use of electronic means of communication, physical proximity was 
necessary for easy and rapid communications and settlement of transactions. The City of London (the 
“Square Mile”) is a prime example of such centralisation. 
But in some countries - such as the U.S. and Russia or the euro area - there may be several financial 
centres, possibly spanning a number of different time zones.  This multiplicity of centres can give rise to 
two problems: first, how does the financial system as a whole, and the central bank in particular, cope 
with operations in different time zones - particularly if, as for example in Russia, there is a large span 
and in some cases little or no overlap in business hours?  Second, if the central bank is to operate in a 
number of different centres, how can it ensure co-ordination of its actions without slowing down its 
operations unduly?   Of course, the advances in communications technology of the late 20
th and early 
21
st Centuries have meant that pressure for geographical centralisation has generally decreased.
A key issue in any market is to adopt a clear and consistent policy to define the end of a business day. 
For some purposes this may need to be universal - for instance, the operating hours and booking policy 
of a nationwide payment or settlement system.  And some contracts may need to specify which time
zone is being used - e.g. “payment to be received by 3:00pm London time”.  For others, it would be on a 
bank-by-bank basis - for instance, a bank may define the end of the day, for its own ledger purposes, at 
a particular time each evening, perhaps when electronic data is downloaded for overnight batch 
processing.  In any case, the settlement date of a transaction is likely to be more critical than the 
transaction date. 
For other purposes, the central bank and the financial markets could accept an inequality between 
different regions.  Same-day settlement for large-value transfers might be available in one major centre 
only, on the grounds that those companies for which this is important are likely to have an office in the 
financial capital, and the value-added in providing such a system nationwide may not justify the costs 
involved.
The second issue, that of co-ordination and consistency of the central bank’s own operations, rests 
importantly on whether it is merely the transactions, or also the decisions, which might be de-
74centralised.  This in turn may depend on the political balance in the country between 
federalism/regionalism and centralisation.  But in any case it may make sense for commercial banks to 
be permitted to deal only with the head office or a nominated branch of the central bank; or for the head 
office only of the commercial bank to deal with the central bank.  This should prevent possible 
confusion if, for instance, several branches of the commercial bank entered into transactions with 
different branches of the central bank. 
With OMOs, where the central bank takes the initiative, decisions must be taken centrally.  If
implementation is to be decentralised, the OMO division of the central bank will need to have in place 
the necessary systems to allow quick communication with its branches in order to minimise the time
delay between taking decisions and implementing them. For example, the ECB follows a policy of 
centralisation for the co-ordination of OMOs: the liquidity allotment decision is made by the ECB.  But 
the transactions are conducted on a decentralised basis between the National Central Banks (e.g. the 
Banque de France and the Bundesbank) and their counterparties.  The need to minimise the time delay 
between the centralised decision and the decentralised implementation is countered, to some extent, by 
the fact that these operations are settled on a T+1 basis.  Nevertheless it is still important for
counterparties to know the results quickly (ideally within 30 minutes or so) after the OMO, even if 
settlement is delayed.
As use of standing facilities is at the banks’ initiative, and to the extent it is for small amounts, it can be 
handled on a decentralised basis. This is effectively what happens in the US, and in the euro area. If a 
bank’s reserve requirements and access to intraday credit (for payment system purposes) are maintained
in a single account, the central bank’s monitoring task is easier.  If the commercial banks maintain
accounts at different branches of the central bank but these are not consolidated daily, the central bank 
may need rapid reporting to the centre of the use of standing facilities so that it can monitor the total 
(and perhaps limit its exposure to particular types of collateral).
There may be times when liquidity in the banking sector does not appear to be flowing easily from one 
region to another, resulting in different interest rates across the country and thus, on the face of it, an 
uneven monetary policy.  The central bank will then need to distinguish between problems caused by 
inadequate financial infrastructure, where it may therefore legitimately play a role in facilitating
liquidity transfers (for instance by lending in one region rather than another); and, on the other hand, 
differences caused by poor credit-worthiness, or inefficient or uncompetitive behaviour by banks in a 
particular region.  In the latter case the central bank should leave market mechanisms to resolve the 
problem; or perhaps play a temporary, catalytic role, providing it can avoid taking on excessive risk 
itself.
75If the central bank is prepared to accept commercial bills as well as government securities in its money-
market operations then, depending on how such bills are defined, it may be necessary to use the branch 
network of the central bank in checking the eligibility of bills issued by companies in a branch’s locality 
(or, in case of default by the borrowing bank, for presentation to the commercial company for payment).
Here the decision in favour of decentralisation would depend not on whether to provide liquidity, but on 
whether to accept a particular bill as collateral in a given operation. 
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